Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO CIA ACTIVITIES IN HONDURAS IN THE 1980s
(96-0125-IG)

August 27, 1997

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Approved for Release
Date SEPT 1998

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Errata

(U) Paragraph 541

[redacted]

(U) Paragraphs 568 and 569

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AIC	Atlantic Intelligence Command
AOG	U.S. Army Operational Group, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
Asset	Any individual or entity with whom CIA has an operational relationship from which the U.S. Government derives benefit.
AVS	Asset Validation System
C-2	Honduran Military Intelligence
CATF	Central American Task Force, Latin American Division, CIA
CI	Counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIC	Counterintelligence Center, CIA
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCUSACOM	Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
CLFL	Clearance and Foreign Liaison Section, Counterintelligence Center, CIA
Collaborating Agent	An asset who has made a formal commitment to collaborate with CIA and knowingly responds to tasking.

Cooperative Contact	A person who wittingly responds to certain tasking from CIA but is not controlled to the point that he/she will accept all tasking.
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCID	Director of Central Intelligence Directive
[redacted]	[redacted]
DDCI	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DI	Directorate of Intelligence, CIA
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DNI	Honduran Department of National Investigations
DO	Directorate of Operations, CIA
DoE	Department of Energy
ELACH	Honduran Anti-Communist Liberation Arm
EYES ONLY	A restrictive indicator used to signify that information is for the exclusive attention of a specific person.
FDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Force
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act

[redacted]

FUSEP	Honduran National Police Force
HPSCI	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Congress
HRF	Hostage Rescue Force
HWG	Honduras Working Group, CIA
IG	Inspector General
IMS	Information Management Staff, DO
INR	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INSCOM	U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
IOB	President's Intelligence Oversight Board
JSOC	U.S. Joint Special Operations Command
LA	Latin America Division, DO
[redacted]	[redacted]
MFR	Memorandum for the Record
NFN	National File Number - A unique number used to reference an intelligence source.
NSA	National Security Agency

NSC	National Security Council
[redacted]	
OCA	Office of Congressional Affairs, CIA
OGC	Office of General Counsel, CIA
OLL	Office of Legislative Liaison, CIA
OPS	Office of Personnel Security, CIA
PCH	Communist Party of Honduras
PCS	Policy Coordination Staff, DO
[redacted]	
PRT-250	Secure Voice Crisis Communications Network
PRTCH	Central America Revolutionary Workers Party - Honduran Branch
SDC	Honduran Superior Defense Council

Sensitive Memorandum	A method of disseminating intelligence to a limited number of specific senior U.S. Government officials due to the extreme sensitivity of the information or source.
SFC	Special Forces Command, Honduran Armed Forces
[redacted]	[redacted]
SSCI	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Congress
USCINCSO	United States Commander in Chief, Southern Command
USCINCACOM	United States Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command
[redacted]	[redacted]

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
INVESTIGATIONS STAFF

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO CIA ACTIVITIES IN HONDURAS IN THE 1980s (96-0125-IG)

August 27, 1997

INTRODUCTION

1. (U) *Baltimore Sun* Allegations. In June 1995, *The Baltimore Sun* published a four-part series of articles based upon the results of a purported 14-month investigation regarding the role of the United States in Honduras in the 1980s. During that investigation, *Baltimore Sun* staff correspondents reportedly obtained unclassified and declassified documents and conducted numerous interviews of U.S. and Honduran citizens. *The Sun* series alleged that:

- Hundreds of Honduran citizens suspected of subversion had been kidnapped, tortured and killed in the 1980s by a Honduran military intelligence unit, known as the 316th Battalion, that was trained and supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);

- CIA knew of the crimes committed by the 316th Battalion, yet continued to support the unit and collaborate with its leaders;

- CIA participated in interrogations and torture of Honduran military prisoners;

- U.S. Embassy, Tegucigalpa, human rights reports in the early 1980s intentionally understated abuses by the Honduran Government; and

- U. S. officials deliberately misled Congress and the U.S. public about Honduran military human rights abuses in order to maintain U.S. funding for Honduras in the war against Communism in Central America.

2. (S) Honduras Working Group Findings and Unresolved Issues. Congressional and National Security Council (NSC) interest in *The Sun's* allegations prompted then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John M. Deutch to direct that a review be conducted of all CIA files to determine CIA's role in Honduras and whether its personnel were linked to human rights abuses there from 1980 to 1995. The Honduras Working Group was established in July 1995 to conduct this review and published its final report in August 1996. Based upon the written record, selected interviews that were conducted by the Office of Personnel Security (OPS) on behalf of the Honduras Working Group, and responses to questionnaires that the Honduras Working Group prepared and distributed to 34 CIA officers in an attempt to resolve several issues, the review resulted in the following findings:

- There is no information in CIA files indicating that CIA officers either authorized or were directly involved in human rights abuses;

- The Honduran military committed hundreds of human rights abuses since 1980, many of which were politically motivated and officially sanctioned;

- CIA reporting linked Honduran military personnel to "death squad" activities;

- [redacted] o several Honduran security units whose personnel were linked to killings, torture, disappearances, and illegal detentions;

- CIA reporting corroborated the involvement in human rights abuses of two Honduran military personnel [redacted]

- [redacted]

- The CIA's record in reporting human rights abuses was inconsistent. In some cases, reporting was timely and complete. In other case[redacted] information was not reported at all [redacted] or was mentioned only in internal CIA channels and not disseminated to other agencies;

- [redacted] reporting inadequacies precluded CIA Headquarters from understanding the scope of human rights abuses in Honduras and the culpability o[redacted] and

- CIA reporting to Congress in the early 1980s underestimated Hondura[redacted] involvement in abuses. By the mid-1980s, CIA provided more detailed information to Congress, but some of the notifications were inaccurate.

3. (U) The Honduras Working Group briefed House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Staff members regarding its findings on August 9 and September 17, 1996, respectively. Honduras Working Group members also briefed selected officials of the NSC, State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the President's Intelligence Oversight Board.

4. (S) Based upon its review of only the written record, limited interviews and questionnaire responses, the Honduras Working Group reported to CIA Executive Director Nora Slatkin that it was unable to resolve the following key issues:

- Whether [redacted] any [redacted] CIA employee was present during sessions of hostile interrogation or torture in Honduras;

- Whether [redacted] failed to follow-up in reporting that the Chief of the Honduran Special Forces Battalion [redacted] had killed insurgent leader Reyes Mata and other insurgents—possibly including American priest Father James Carney; whether Headquarters tasked [redacted] to determine what happened to Carney in view of repeated queries from Congress and the Carney family; why Headquarters did not provide [redacted] with complete information [redacted]

- Whether [redacted] failed to report mistreatment of an Agency asset [redacted] to either [redacted] or to visiting SSCI Staff members, and whether there should have been follow-up reporting [redacted]

[redacted] on ELACH, a right-wing paramilitary organization that allegedly committed human rights abuses, in view of DCI Casey's commitment to the Hill to do so.

In July 1996, the Executive Director requested that the Inspector General (IG) initiate an investigation to address these key issues. In August 1996, she requested that the IG also investigate alleged conflicts in the testimony given by a CIA employee to HPSCI Staff members and to OPS officers regarding information about the death of the American priest.

5. (U) In July 1996, the Executive Director also assigned a series of potential accountability issues to the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) for consideration. The accountability documents prepared by the Honduras Working Group for the Executive Director and presented to the DDO identified several issues and stated several conclusions based on the efforts of the Working Group. In August 1996, the DDO deferred these accountability issues pending the completion of this IG investigation. The potential accountability issues that were deferred by the DDO are discussed at the end of this Report. Another memorandum was sent to the Executive Director by the head of the Working Group at the Executive Director's request. This memorandum identified specific individuals whose actions should be reviewed for accountability purposes. The Executive Director also deferred action on that memorandum until this investigation was concluded. That memorandum has been sealed and has not been reviewed by IG personnel, pending the completion of this Report.

6. (S) Scope of the Inspector General Investigation. The IG investigation has been limited to information relating to the three key issues raised by the Honduras Working Group and the conflicts in testimony that were referred to the IG by the Executive Director in July and August 1996.

BACKGROUND

7. (S) Overview of U.S.-Honduras Relations in the 1980s. In order to address the issues presented in this Report, it is necessary to understand the political context [redacted] Honduras were conducted and how [redacted] related to the Honduran Government and its military services.

8. (U) The decade of the 1980s was a time of great turbulence for Honduras, Central America's poorest country and the fourth poorest in the Western Hemisphere. At the beginning of the decade, the country was ruled by a military dictatorship that was beginning to cede power to civilian political leaders. This difficult process was complicated by an unsettled external environment. Bordered by three stronger and sometimes hostile neighbors—El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala—Honduras has lived with the threat of foreign attack since becoming independent. This traditional sense of foreign danger was heightened by the establishment of a revolutionary government in Nicaragua in 1979 and the outbreak of a leftist insurgency in El Salvador in 1981. The emergent threat induced Honduras to cooperate with El Salvador—a traditional adversary—and to support the expanding armed resistance to the Nicaraguan regime. This deepening commitment strengthened Honduras' traditional security ties to the United States and made it a key player in U.S. Central American security policy.

9. (U) Expanding domestic leftist subversive activity in the 1980s added to Tegucigalpa's sense of vulnerability. Nicaraguan support for militants of the Honduran Communist Party and several like-minded radical groups were the main sources of this political ferment. Beginning with minor bombings, these organizations eventually progressed to hijackings and kidnappings. In July 1983, a small unit of Nicaraguan-trained leftist guerrillas crossed the frontier between Honduras and Nicaragua. However, it was ill-equipped, lacked a domestic base of support and was quickly overcome by the Honduran Army during what came to be called "the Olancho

Operation." A similar incursion in 1984 also failed to incite the conservative Honduran peasantry. Although marginal, the perceived leftist threat led to an internal security crackdown. According to human rights organizations, a joint Army-police paramilitary unit, the 316th Battalion, orchestrated a campaign of disappearances and assassinations against Honduran leftists and Salvadoran exiles that claimed at least 100 victims.

10. (U) In 1983, under the leadership of Commander-In-Chief of the Honduran Armed Forces (CINC) General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, the Honduran armed forces sought to expand cooperation with the Salvadoran and Guatemalan militaries. Alvarez's increasing militancy, however, as well as his blatant political ambitions, aroused the hostility of his colleagues, who ousted him in March 1984. His successor, General Walter Lopez Reyes, adopted a more reserved stance toward regional military ties and U.S. policy aims. He closed the Regional Military Training Center, sought to scale back the scope of joint military exercises, and demanded further increases in military aid in return for Honduran cooperation with Washington. A new military assistance accord signed in May 1985 generally scaled back the Honduran commitment to assist U.S. regional military policy.

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


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

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

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[redacted]

21. [redacted]

22. (S) Gustavo Alvarez Martinez. Alvarez [redacted] attended an Argentine military academy and various U.S. sponsored military courses at Fort Benning, Georgia and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, during the 1950s and 1960s. [redacted]

23. (S) In January 1982, Alvarez became the CINC of the Honduran Armed Forces. During the period from 1981 through his forced removal from office by rival officers on March 31, 1984, Alvarez was heavily involved in, and a strong supporter of, CIA programs in Central America. After his ouster from the position of CINC, Alvarez resettled in the United States. He later returned to Honduras and was assassinated on January 25, 1989. A group known as the Popular Liberation Movement claimed responsibility for this act.

24. [redacted]

25. [redacted]



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

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

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

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

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

[redacted]

32. [redacted]

33. [redacted]

34. [redacted]

35. [redacted]



36.

37.

38.

[redacted]

39. [redacted]

(S) CIA Policies Regarding Human Rights and Interrogations Between 1976 and 1996

40. (S) CIA Human Rights Policies. The DO has issued several sources of guidance since the mid-1970s that explained the CIA's policies regarding human rights to CIA employees.

41. (S) On March 29, 1976, a Headquarters cable advised [redacted] employees must be especially sensitive to the political and possible legal ramifications of what the CIA does [redacted] This cable also included a description of [redacted] responsibilities if it were to be discovered [redacted] that a host or third country intelligence or security service was about to undertake actions that could reasonably be construed to be gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. [redacted] were advised in this cable that, as a general rule, [redacted] should make appropriate efforts to prevent or delay such actions [redacted]

42. (S) DO policy guidance [redacted] concerning human rights also included [redacted] dated November 11, 1976. This notice stated specifically that DO personnel were not to participate, directly or indirectly, in violations of human rights.

43. (S) A January 31, 1977 cable [redacted] indicated a continuing process to provide specific guidelines [redacted] regarding the human rights factor [redacted] This cable stated, in part, that:

> . . . Elements of the [DO] must be continually alert to indications that foreign governments or individuals have taken, are taking, or plan to take, actions that constitute gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, or other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty and the security of the person. . . .

44. (S) On June 22, 1978, then-DDO John M. McMahon forwarded a memorandum to all DO division and staff chiefs [redacted] The purpose of this memorandum was to reaffirm Agency policies on human rights and other matters and to emphasize to DO personnel that the policies were still in effect [redacted]

[redacted]

45. (S) A November 11, 1988 Headquarters cable [redacted] noted the importance of human rights. [redacted] The cable stated, in part, that:

> . . . We all must become sensitized to the importance of respecting human rights, and we must ensur[redacted] are equally sensitive. The issue will only become more important, and we serve our objectives best, if we remember that if we ignore the importance of the human rights issue in the final analysis we do great damage to our mission. We are under great scrutiny.
>
> Aside from the legal and policy considerations that are constant in any allegation concerning violations of human rights, we also must recognize a basic moral obligation. We are Americans and we must reflect American values in the conduct of our business. We are all inherently opposed to the violation of human rights. Those who work with us in one capacity or another must also respect these values.

46. (S) The January 31, 199[redacted] defines human rights violations as acts of torture, cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment, or prolonged detention without charges or trial. It also includes causing the disappearance of persons by abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty and security of the person.

47. (S) CIA Interrogation Policy. While statements of policy regarding human rights were made available to [redacted] personnel in the late 1970s and 1980s, no explicit CIA policy statement regarding interrogations has been found prior to 1985. [redacted] A January 14, 1985 Headquarters cable appears to be the first official notice [redacted] egarding an interrogation policy. That cable stated, in part, that:

> . . . Interviewing and interrogation of suspects in custody is a method routinely used by police, security and intelligence services around the world. In many countries, the legal and basic rights of the suspect in custody may not be given full consideration, resulting in deprivation of his/her human rights.

CIA policy is not to participate directly in nor to encourage interrogation that results in use of force, mental or physical torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind, as an aid to interrogation. CIA policy is to actively discourage the use of these methods during interrogations. CIA should play a positive role in influencing foreign liaison to respect human rights.

[redacted]

48. (S) Section 20 of the January 31, 199[redacted] entitled Human Rights Violations and other Proscribed Acts, provided guidance regarding CIA's interrogation policy. It stated, in part, that:

> . . . It is CIA policy to neither participate directly in nor encourage interrogation that involves the use of force, mental or physical torture, extremely demeaning indignities or exposure to inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to interrogation. [redacted] Such participation includes being in the room during an interrogation, sitting in an adjoining room monitoring the interrogation or providing questions while an interrogation is in progress.

[redacted] there must be firm

> intelligence or operational justification for indirect participation in interrogation and reasonable assurance that no human rights violations will occur. . . .

The January 31, 1996 [redacted] also distinguishes between an interrogation and a debriefing:

> . . . Interrogation is questioning a person who is not free to refuse to answer the questions or leave at will without fear of retribution. A person being questioned who may refuse to cooperate or leave is being debriefed, not interrogated.

49. (S) Present and former DO managers and officers state that these CIA human rights and interrogation policies are well known throughout the DO. In support of this, they cite actions such as briefings in the field by Headquarters representatives and inclusion of these policies in the Career Trainee program as examples of the DO's continuing effort to ensure that its officers are aware of these policies.

PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES

50. (S) Three Investigators, a Research Assistant and a Secretary initially were assigned full-time to this investigation. The team was supplemented by two additional Investigators from January to May 1997 to assist with the research and interview phases of the investigation. CIA components were requested to provide copies of all internal and external documents that were relevant to the issues under investigation. This included official and soft files, finished intelligence, taskings, notes, letters, correspondence, communications, cables, and briefing books; all information regarding liaison, interaction and communication between CIA and the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State, Department of Defense, National Security Agency, other federal agencies, and the Honduran Government and its personnel; and all relevant information concerning liaison, interaction, and communications between CIA and the U.S.

Congress. The materials requested included all [redacted] and other limited distribution materials. Also included were documents, electronic messages, disks, tapes, notes, and other forms of recorded information. As a result of this request, the OIG Team reviewed over 112,000 pages of material in pursuit of relevant information.

51. (S) In addition, searches for specific records were conducted. [redacted] Relevant financial accountings from January to June 1986 were reviewed. CIA policies and regulations governing human rights and participation in interrogations were also reviewed.

52. (S) Forty-five boxes containing the working files of the Honduras Working Group were examined. [redacted] U.S Army operational files were examined and Department of State and Department of Defense documents were reviewed and summarized.

53. (S) Eighty-four individuals were interviewed during the course of the investigation, including current and former employees

of CIA and other federal agencies

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

54. (S) This Report addresses the following questions:

- Was any CIA employee present during sessions of hostile interrogation or torture in Honduras?

- What was the Olancho Operation and who were Reyes Mata and Father James Carney?

- What did report concerning Reyes Mata and Father Carney? Did fail to follow-up CIA reporting that was responsible for killing Reyes Mata and his insurgents—possibly including Father Carney? Did Headquarters task to determine Carney's fate in view of repeated queries from Congress and the Carney family?

- What do Embassy personnel recall regarding Reyes Mata and Carney?

- What other U.S. Government assets reported relevant information regarding Reyes Mata and Carney? Headquarters task to follow-up on non-CIA

reporting concerning Reyes Mata and Carney? What do CIA and other U.S. Government personnel recall regarding this non-CIA reporting?

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- Was there follow-up on the ELACH reporting provided [redacted] especially in view of DCI Casey's commitment to Congress?
- Did [redacted] report mistreatment of [redacted] in 1986 to either Headquarters or visiting SSCI Staff members?
- Did a CIA employee provide conflicting statements regarding the fate of Father Carney to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the CIA?
- What were the findings of the Honduras Working Group documentary review relating to possible accountability issues? What were the relevant findings of the IG investigation in this regard?

FINDINGS

WAS [redacted] ANY [redacted] CIA EMPLOYEE PRESENT DURING SESSIONS OF HOSTILE INTERROGATION OR TORTURE IN HONDURAS?

55. (S) The Origin of the Allegation. In January 1996, the Honduras Working Group sent questionnaires to [redacted] current and former CIA employees who were deemed to be in the best position to answer lingering questions regarding potential human rights abuses by Honduran officials. One response contained an allegation that [redacted] been present during an abusive interrogation of a prisoner in the early 1980s. According to the allegation, [redacted] had told [redacted] interrogation in which a male prisoner was being tortured [redacted]

56. (S) Upon receipt of the allegation that a [redacted] may have been present during an abusive interrogation of a prisoner, the Honduras Working Group forwarded a questionnaire to the former [redacted] employee. [redacted] She also indicated that she could not be certain who was present during the alleged interrogation and torture and that she did not mention [redacted] to anyone [redacted] in the early 1980s. She had told a colleague about it in the early- to mid-1990s, she said, and it was the colleague who reported the information to the Honduras Working Group in 1996. The former [redacted] did not mention [redacted] the name of any [redacted] in her response to the Honduras Working Group questionnaire.

57. (S) Further Details from the Source of the Allegation. [redacted]



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

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

[redacted]

66. [redacted]

67. [redacted]

68. (S) In May 1996, at the request of the Honduras Working Group, two Investigators [redacted] interviewed [redacted] The interview covered various topics relating to the Honduras Working Group's inquiry. During the interview, [redacted] denied that he had ever been present during an interrogation [redacted]

69. (S) [redacted] continues to deny the allegation [redacted] states that he never assisted the Hondurans in conducting interrogations, either directly or indirectly, nor has he ever been involved in inflicting torture on a prisoner. [redacted] cannot offer an explanation for the allegation that he participated in an abusive interrogation.

70. [redacted]



72. (S) CIA Records. [redacted] cables generated by [redacted] and DO files [redacted] June 1983 were reviewed for a possible link [redacted] This review of cables and [redacted] produced no relevant information. Furthermore, no indication has been found in CIA records that any CIA employee participated in any interrogation or torture session in Honduras.

CONCLUSION

73. (S) No evidence has been found to substantiate the allegation by [redacted] that [redacted] any CIA employee was present during sessions of hostile interrogation or torture in Honduras.

WHAT WAS THE OLANCHO OPERATION AND WHO WERE REYES MATA AND FATHER JAMES CARNEY?

74. (S) The 1983 Olancho Insurgency. On July 19, 1983, a 96-member group associated with the Central America Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRTC) marched from Nicaragua into the Olancho Department of Honduras. The PRTC was a leftist extremist group that was originally conceived in 1977 as a regional organization comprised of representatives of the Central American countries and was initiated by the Cubans as a vehicle to spread the Communist revolution. The Honduran branch of the PRTC (PRTCH), led by Jose Maria Reyes Mata, was almost entirely in exile in Nicaragua during 1983. In July 1983, the Honduran Government became aware that the PRTCH and other leftist extremist groups had decided at a June meeting in Mexico, attended by Reyes Mata, to begin rural guerrilla warfare.

75. (S) In early August 1983, the Honduran military became aware that members of the Honduran branch of the PRTC, trained by the Nicaraguans and Cubans, had entered Honduras and were operating between the Coco and Patuca Rivers in Olancho Department. This information came from two Hondurans who had defected from the group. The defectors indicated that the group was organized into three platoons of approximately 36 individuals each. The members of the group reportedly had been issued uniforms similar to those used by the anti-Sandinista Contras so as to fool border residents into thinking that the members were Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries.

76. (S) According to information acquired by the Embassy's [redacted] and [redacted] Reyes Mata, the group's leader, intended to establish a base camp in order to recruit and train personnel within Honduras and hoped to obtain much of the support for this subversive movement from local peasants. Offensive operations by the group were to begin during September and October 1983. Reyes Mata was reported to have $100,000 to finance recruiting, propaganda and resupply.

77. (S) Much of the tactical information obtained by the U.S. Government regarding the Honduran military operation against this group was obtained from [redacted] Early on, [redacted] advised Headquarters that it was limiting its coverage to unique information in order to avoid duplicative reporting by [redacted] and [redacted]

78. (S) On August 26, 1983, the Hondurans provided [redacted] with a list of the insurgents who were in custody and those who were reportedly still in the field. This list contained a reference to a possible priest whose name was either Fausto Milla or Guadalupe and was thought to be 60-65 years old. He was reportedly still in the jungle. Deserters who were interviewed by [redacted] personnel stated that they had been deceived into joining the PRTCH and that the group suffered from a food shortage. The guerrillas who had been captured and who had surrendered were suffering from severe malnutrition and exposure to the elements. Honduran Special Forces Command (SFC), aided by helicopters, patrolled the area searching for the guerrillas.

79. (S) The Honduran military found the guerrillas' base camp on September 7, 1983, and, although there was conflicting information, several guerrilla leaders were reportedly in custody and being questioned. Reyes Mata reportedly had separated from this group prior to September 2. In mid-September, the Hondurans provided [redacted] with an analysis of insurgent debriefings. This document discussed the infrastructure of the guerrilla group and noted that "Father Carney" had facilitated contacts between the group and the civilian population.

80. (S) Although the local media reported Reyes Mata's capture on September 15, 1983, this was not confirmed by Honduran authorities. Honduran officials subsequently reported to [redacted] that Reyes Mata had been killed on September 18, 1983, along with four of his fellow insurgents, during an encounter with the SFC. On

September 19, 1983, the SFC briefed members of the national and international press on the operation and displayed several captured guerrillas and equipment.

81. (S) Involvement of the Hostage Rescue Force. In September 1982, prompted by hostage incidents, discussions between CIA, State Department and senior Honduran Armed Forces officials had been initiated to develop a quick reaction Hostage Rescue Force (HRF) in Honduras. [redacted]

82. (S) CINC Alvarez and the then-Chief of Intelligence for the Honduran Armed Forces General Staff (G-2), who was [redacted] desired that a new organization be created within the Army to serve as the HRF. The new HRF was known as the "Special Squadron" or "Commando Operaciones Especiales" (COE). The unit was subordinate to the then-newly created SFC that was led by a Honduran military officer who [redacted] Another Honduran military officer, [redacted] was the commander of the "Special Squadron", although [redacted] reporting reflects that [redacted] also commanded this sub-unit. HRF training was held at La Venta military camp, which also served as SFC Headquarters.

83. (S) [redacted] During the first two weeks of August 1983, all SFC officers, including those who were undergoing HRF training, were deployed to Olancho Department in order to participate in the counterinsurgent operation there. This included [redacted] CINC

Alvarez had strongly supported the HRF unit and it was believed that [redacted] kept him abreast of developments within the unit. Beginning in early September 1983, [redacted] periodically obtained intelligence from members of the SFC concerning the status of the Olancho Operation and the debriefing of a captured guerrilla, and inspected equipment confiscated by the Honduran military.

84. (S) Who was Reyes Mata? According to CIA records, Jose Maria Reyes Mata was a Honduran physician and long-time pro-Cuban who used the aliases of "Chema" and "Pablo Mendoza." Reyes Mata attended medical schools at the Autonomous University of Honduras and Havana University. He joined the Communist Party of Honduras (PCH) in 1956 and received guerrilla training in Cuba in 1962. In 1964, he supplied food, medical supplies and information concerning the Honduran military to guerrilla groups in Guatemala. In 1969, Reyes Mata was involved with guerrilla activities in Bolivia.

85. (S) Reyes Mata was arrested in Nicaragua for attempting to buy arms but was later released. He also was reported to have arranged guerrilla training for Hondurans in Nicaragua at a training camp staffed by Cuban paramilitary instructors. Reyes Mata returned to Honduras and was imprisoned in connection with the April 1980 kidnapping of a U.S. citizen working in Honduras. Reyes Mata had also participated in the firebombing of a San Pedro Sula textile factory.

86. (S) In September 1980, Reyes Mata was freed under an amnesty program in Tegucigalpa and subsequently became the leader of the PRTCH. In early August 1983, the Honduran intelligence service notified U.S. Embassy personnel that Honduran guerrillas, led by Reyes Mata and trained in Cuba and Nicaragua, had entered Olancho Department with the intention of establishing an encampment. [redacted] n October 1983 and June 1995 indicate that Reyes Mata was captured in the course of the Olancho Operation and executed by [redacted] while in the custody of the Honduran military.

87. (U) Who was Father Carney? According to media accounts, James Francis Carney was born in 1924 in Chicago, Illinois and served in World War II. In his 30's, Carney entered the priesthood and joined the Jesuit order. In 1964, Carney became a parish priest in the Honduran town of El Progreso and decided to call himself Padre Guadalupe, or Padre Lupe. Carney became committed to the plight of peasants, known as campesinos, and an activist for their cause. This resulted in his becoming a controversial figure within Honduras, including accusations that he was a Communist. In mid-1968, the Honduran Government attempted to deport Carney because of his activism. Then-U.S. Ambassador to Honduras John Jova reportedly interceded and Carney was allowed to continue his activities in the country.

88. (C) On December 14, 1973, a decree was issued naturalizing Carney as a Honduran. He renounced his U.S. citizenship on May 14, 1974. In 1979, Carney had a dispute with the leadership of the National Campesino Association (ANACH) that he accused of using strong-arm tactics, engaging in corruption and receiving support from the U.S. Embassy and CIA. Carney supported an insurgent candidate for ANACH president. The Honduran Government considered Carney to be a radical leftist agitator and he was stripped of Honduran citizenship and deported on November 17, 1979.

89. (U) After a short stay in the United States, Carney began working in Nicaragua. According to media reports, Carney and an insurgent force of 96 individuals led by Reyes Mata crossed the Coco River from Nicaragua in mid-July 1983 in the hope of launching a Honduran revolution. During a September 19, 1983 Honduran Government press conference, it was announced that "Padre Guadalupe," who was known to the insurgents as "Companero Mario," had apparently died of starvation after the guerrillas ran out of food.

90. (C) [redacted]



91. (C) The Embassy arranged for the Carney family to meet with the second-ranking officer in the Honduran military—the Chief of Staff—and approximately 20 of the captured guerrillas. The captured insurgents interviewed by Carney's family and [redacted] according to the DoS, indicated that the priest had become progressively weaker during the march through the jungle and that individual guerrillas had been assigned to assist him. He was reportedly last seen alive on August 30, 1983.

92. (U) During U.S. Consul General interviews with the captured guerrillas—all of whom claimed that they had deserted from the insurgency—it was learned that the priest was known to them as "Companero Mario." Many of those interviewed knew of "Padre Guadelupe" from his work, including educational radio broadcasts. One individual had recognized the priest from a Honduran newspaper article and one knew him from past association at a parish in El Progreso. The Consul General presented a newspaper photograph of Carney to the captured guerrillas and all confirmed that this was the priest who had accompanied them.

93. (U) One of the guerrillas who deserted on August 20 stated that Carney had said that he could not proceed much further and that the march was killing him. Another deserter who saw Carney on

August 30, 1983 described the priest as "cadaverous" in appearance and requiring the assistance of others to continue. Several captured insurgents commented that they did not know how he could still be alive, but none could confirm Carney's death or attribute it to the harsh jungle conditions. None of the interviewed guerrillas had witnessed any combat with the Honduran military.

94. (U) The U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa obtained from the Honduran Government and provided to the Carney family religious items believed to have belonged to the priest, and continued to seek answers to the family members' questions after their departure from Honduras. In mid-October 1983, the Honduran Government advised in a diplomatic note that it had not located Carney's body, nor did it accept responsibility for the welfare or whereabouts of the priest since he had not entered the country legally.

95. (U) The August 4-11, 1984 edition of *The Nation* magazine published an article entitled "The Mysterious Death of Father Carney" that described the efforts by the Carney family to learn details surrounding his fate. The article also contained allegations that U.S. intelligence and military personnel took part in the counterinsurgent operation and may have been present when Carney died. It was alleged that a deserter from the group, who was subsequently "shot trying to escape," had talked to his relatives during a prison visit regarding certain events that were alleged to have taken place at El Aguacate Air Base. His story was provided to the Christian Human Rights Commission of Honduras. That group later released this information and alleged that U.S. advisers identified as "Lieutenant West Blank" and "Major Mark Kelvi" were directly involved in torture and interrogation that culminated in the murder of Carney and other revolutionary leaders. These actions were purported to have occurred in underground cells at El Aguacate. According to *The Nation*, no further evidence had come to light about the CIA's presence at El Aguacate and U.S. officials declined to make any comments.

96. (U) In response to an October 1, 1984 letter to DCI Casey from Carney's family, the Agency's Director of Public Affairs sought to assure the family members that CIA had no involvement in the fate of the priest as alleged in *The Nation*. With reference to the purported involvement of "West Blank" and "Mark Kelvi," the family was advised that it was CIA policy not to confirm or deny the employment of specific individuals. In a January 3, 1985 letter to the Carney family, the Agency's Director of Public Affairs advised that "Blank" and "Kelvi" were not employed by CIA.

(U) Previous CIA Investigations Regarding Carney

97. (S) **CIA's Office of General Counsel's 1988 Investigation.** A March 24, 1988 report prepared by CIA's Office of General Counsel (OGC) summarized its review of the circumstances surrounding the 1983 disappearance of Carney and the Agency's handling of his family's 1984 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. This review was prompted by a January 4, 1988 letter to then-DCI William Webster suggesting that CIA had been involved in Carney's disappearance and that CIA had information in its possession concerning his fate. On February 4, 1988, Carney's family filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against CIA and several other agencies alleging violations of the FOIA.

98. (S) OGC's inquiry was based upon a review of documents and conversations with DO personnel who were familiar with the issue of Carney's disappearance. The review found that information in CIA's possession concerning Carney was obtained from a [redacted] debriefing of deserters in Honduras, conversations with Honduran military officials and press reports. One of the deserters who talked with [redacted] mentioned that a priest was with the group and was in especially poor physical condition due to starvation. The deserter offered his opinion that the priest did not live much longer after the deserter had left the group.

99. (S) [redacted] reportedly was informed by the Honduran military that it had found a badly decomposed body in the jungle with religious effects nearby. The Honduran military did not attempt to recover this body, and that of two others found in the vicinity, reportedly because of the terrain and the Honduran military's desire to pursue the group. It had been concluded that the body near the religious articles was that of a priest, presumably Carney.

100. (S) The OGC review also indicated that a representative of [redacted] in response to several inquiries from Congress, had [redacted] and queried [redacted] for information on Carney. The [redacted] reportedly understood that most [redacted] information came from [redacted] The information from these sources was consistent with information obtained by [redacted] and indicated that Carney died of starvation. This information had reportedly been shared with interested members of Congress.

101. (S) The OGC review concluded that CIA was not involved in planning or carrying out the Olancho Operation, had no connection with Carney and had learned of his fate after the fact. The OGC review further concluded that the information that had been reviewed strongly suggested that Carney died of starvation. Finally, the OGC review concluded that CIA's handling of the Carney family's FOIA requests was consistent with standard CIA procedures, FOIA and applicable case law.

102. (U) DCI Webster advised the Carney family in an April 7, 1988 letter of the OGC conclusions that CIA did not know exactly what became of Carney and that he most likely perished in the Honduran jungle from starvation and exposure. The DCI's letter also advised that CIA had no evidence or information indicating that Carney had been tortured or murdered. The Carney family replied in an April 26, 1988 letter that they continued to believe that Carney

was executed at El Aguacate with ". . . CIA knowledge, complicity, if not actual involvement. . . ." and that the DCI should further investigate the matter.

103. (U) CIA's Office of Inspector General's 1988 Investigation. In response to a June 5, 1988 *New York Times Magazine* article containing allegations by Florencio Caballero, a former member of the Honduran military, CIA Inspector General William Donnelly initiated an investigation on June 9, 1988. Caballero alleged CIA complicity in human rights abuses perpetrated by the Honduran military. In one specific claim, Caballero indicated that he had been trained in interrogation techniques by CIA and had interrogated Carney. Additionally, Caballero claimed that the priest and 70 captured guerrillas had been executed.

104. (S) In the course of the 1988 investigation, OIG personnel interviewed 21 individuals, including CIA Officers [redacted] CIA responses to congressional inquiries also were reviewed, as was the March 1988 OGC report concerning the circumstances of Carney's disappearance.

105. (U) The August 24, 1988 Report of Investigation that was issued at the end of the OIG inquiry concluded as to the Carney issue that CIA learned of Carney's fate only after the fact and that the priest's death resulted from starvation. The OIG Report also indicated that information available to CIA concerning Carney's fate had been provided to Congress in 1983-1984.

106. (U) The SSCI was not satisfied with the 1988 OIG investigation's findings regarding CIA's alleged complicity in human rights abuses in Honduras and subsequently conducted its own investigation into that issue. During this process, follow-up questions were directed to CIA and Caballero testified before the SSCI. Transcribed testimony before the SSCI in November 1988 indicates that Caballero told the Committee that, contrary to the

statements attributed to him in the June 5, 1988 *New York Times* article, he ". . . did not see Father Carney, meet him, nor interrogate him."

WHAT DID [redacted] REPORT CONCERNING REYES MATA AND FATHER CARNEY? DID [redacted] FAIL TO FOLLOW-UP CIA REPORTING THAT [redacted] WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR KILLING REYES MATA AND HIS INSURGENTS--POSSIBLY INCLUDING FATHER CARNEY?[2] [redacted] TO DETERMINE CARNEY'S FATE IN VIEW OF REPEATED QUERIES FROM CONGRESS AND THE CARNEY FAMILY?

(U) Relevant Reporting, Follow-up and Tasking Regarding Reyes Mata and Father Carney.[3]

107. (S) September 21, 1983 [redacted] forwarded [redacted] an article from the September 20, 1983 issue of *El Tiempo*. [redacted] The article reported the death in an ambush of Reyes Mata and, according to [redacted] the "... presumed death by starvation of another leader of the group, former Jesuit priest Guadalupe Carney."

108. (S) The *El Tiempo* article also cited an unspecified Honduran Army spokesman who was located in Nueva Palestina and involved in the Olancho Operation as reporting that Reyes Mata had died in combat. His body could not be recovered since the location was inaccessible and the patrol that had killed him had not yet left the jungle. Reyes Mata, described as thin due to the shortage of food, was identified by the patrol as he was well known and had unmistakable characteristics. Pictures and fingerprints of the insurgent leader were taken for use in the media.

109. (S) According to the *El Tiempo* article of September 20, 1983, deserters said that "Father Guadeloupe Carney" had died of

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[2] [redacted]

[3] (S) The communications summarized in this section are only those that include information relating to Reyes Mata or Father Carney. An annex to this Report of Investigation contains additional summaries of 32 [redacted] Cables/Memorandum. These relate to the Olancho Operation, the insurgency, and [redacted] as [redacted] but do not include information regarding Reyes Mata or Father Carney.

starvation at the end of June 1983 in an area called Somotines between Bocay and Tablazo. The deserters further indicated that "they had to carry Father Guadeloupe for two days but finally he died, given his serious condition due to inanition." The article gave a synopsis of Father Guadalupe's service in Honduras, his deportation from that country, his eventual travel to Nicaragua, and his return to the United States in 1979 where he recovered his U.S. citizenship.

110. (S) According to [redacted] 26 guerrillas had been killed in encounters with the Honduran Army, 23 had been captured or deserted, 10 were reported to have died of starvation in the mountains and one was reportedly executed by the guerrillas. Another guerrilla was believed to have returned to Nicaragua.

111. (S) September 21, 1983 [redacted] of an Associated Press (AP) story of the same day concerning "an American priest who had joined leftist guerrillas [and] died of exhaustion while trying to flee Honduran troops." The AP story stated that "Colonel Cesar Elvir Sierra said that James Francis Carney, 48, a Roman Catholic priest from St. Louis, died while trying to escape with a rebel force in the jungles of Olancho Province during a government sweep of a mountainous area near the Nicaraguan border." Elvir also reported that Reyes Mata had been killed during the operation.

112. (S) The AP story stated that Carney, a Jesuit priest, had been expelled from Honduras in 1979 after being accused of trying to organize a peasant revolt. Sources at the Jesuit Missouri Province in St. Louis were cited as saying that their records showed Carney was still a member of the Jesuits and had been reassigned to the Central American Province. [redacted] to confirm the facts surrounding Carney's fate [redacted] so [redacted] might respond to anticipated congressional queries.

113. (S) September 22, 1983 [redacted] advised [redacted] that available information concerning Carney led to the presumption that he died of starvation. On September 21, 1983, [redacted] who confirmed that Carney's body was not found, that authorities did not know where to look, and that there was very little likelihood that the body would be found. What was known of Carney's fate had reportedly been provided by one of three deserters who were involved in a news conference at Nueva Palestina on September 19, 1983.

114. (S) The deserter reported at Nueva Palestina that Carney had been weakened by starvation to the point that he had been unable to walk for two days. As a result, he was being carried in relays by the stronger of the remaining guerrillas. [redacted] commented that it was unlikely that this could have continued for long since all in the group were near starvation. The three deserters reported last seeing Carney deep in the Cordillera Entre Rios.

115. (S) [redacted] advised that the biographical information contained in the September 21, 1983 [redacted] cable was the extent of its knowledge concerning Carney. [redacted] indicated that, under the name of "Guadalupe," Carney had written a book on the Honduran peasant movement that was published in Nicaragua and Cuba. In September 1981, Carney reportedly attempted to obtain guerrilla training but was denied the opportunity, possibly because of his age. [redacted] referenced a DoS message stating that Carney's sister had inquired about her brother and gave his birth year as either 1927 or 1930. The Embassy had no information that Carney had reacquired his U.S. citizenship.

116. [redacted]

[redacted]

117. (S) [redacted] indicated that it did not have the resources to devote to the task requested by Negroponte and that the U.S. military had devoted the full attention of three officers to report on the Olancho Operation. [redacted] had stopped extracting and refining key information from the voluminous material because the U.S. military had already reported the same information. [redacted]

118. (S) September 23, 1983 [redacted] Cable. [redacted] advised that it agreed in principle to the idea of carrying out a more focused analysis of the Olancho guerrilla movement. [redacted] Once that task was accomplished, a decision would be made regarding whether additional efforts were warranted.

119. (S) September 28, 1983 Headquarters Memorandum. CIA's OLL forwarded a memorandum to the Directorate of Operations, [redacted] advising that Chairman Edward P. Boland of the HPSCI was personally interested in CIA information concerning the fate of Carney. HPSCI Chief Counsel Michael O'Neil reportedly advised that the DoS had indicated that the Honduran Government claimed not to know about Carney's fate.

120. (S) October 3, 1983 Headquarters Memorandum. The Acting Chief of DO/LA prepared a draft response to Boland's inquiry. The draft indicated [redacted] reporting substantiated

the press accounts of Carney's death and that Honduran debriefings of deserters revealed that Carney had been weak and died of starvation. The Hondurans also believed that there was little likelihood that his body would be recovered. The draft response, whose final disposition is unknown, was forwarded through DO components to OLL.

121. (S) October 6, 1983 [redacted] In response to [redacted] September 22, 1983 request for analytic assistance concerning the Olancho insurgency, [redacted] traveled to Tegucigalpa. On October 6, he reported his findings [redacted] reviewed documents consisting of photocopies of unmarked maps; general lessons on guerrilla warfare; lists of medical supplies; inventories of equipment carried by some members of the group; guides to explosives and incendiary devices; books and other material on Marxism-Leninism, capitalism and political economics; pamphlets on how to reconcile Marxism and Christianity; the diary belonging to Reyes Mata; lists of radio frequencies; an apparent code; lecture notes; and personal material such as poems and songs.

122. (S) [redacted] noted in the cable that the 88-page diary found on Reyes Mata was missing pages 75-82 and recorded the hardships, lack of food, desertions, and personal disappointments of the author. [redacted] had the opportunity to interview several of the deserters and described them as young, uneducated and somewhat disoriented. They all claimed to have been tricked into participating in the guerrilla operation.

123. (S) In summary, [redacted] indicated that the documents, debriefings, local studies, and the deserters themselves all demonstrated little cause to devote time and resources to a more in-depth analysis. Although it was likely that additional attempts at guerrilla infiltration would occur, he believed that there were insufficient documents or high level deserters to warrant additional [redacted] resources at that time. According to the Hondurans, only three

of the original guerrillas remained at large. Another arms cache had been discovered and [redacted] would continue to check for any additional documents that might be uncovered in this or other caches.

124. [redacted]

125. (S) [redacted] was asked to advise [redacted] as to what actions were being taken to address the Ambassador's request.

126. (S) October 12, 1983 [redacted] stated that the Olancho insurgency was so quickly crushed that it failed to become a crisis. This was in part due to bad planning by the guerrillas, but ". . . also reflected very well upon the performance of the Honduran Airmobile Squadron [redacted]

127. (S) October 15, 1983 [redacted] that it had received information indicating that PRTCH guerrillas who had been captured by the Honduran Armed Forces in

Olancho Department had been summarily executed by Honduran Army officers after being debriefed. Among those executed was Reyes Mata, his Deputy Commander "Commandante Zaata," and a Nicaraguan advisor who had accompanied the guerrilla force. The executions reportedly were initiated after the "field commander" in Olancho--not otherwise identified--received an order from the Honduran Armed Forces General Staff to "search and destroy." This order was construed as meaning that no prisoners were to be taken alive. The order came after 23 prisoners had been captured and evacuated from the area.

128. (S) The executions reportedly were carried out by officers in an isolated area away from the enlisted troops. The deaths were later reported to the media as having occurred as a result of the guerrillas resisting capture [redacted] tated that the justification within the Honduran military for the executions was that the initial 23 low-level and ideologically uncommitted guerrillas who had deserted or been taken prisoner were sufficient for exploitation purposes. The remaining guerrillas were judged to be dedicated revolutionaries who were beyond rehabilitation. It was also reasoned that the combination of impotent Honduran law and the protestations of leftist peace groups would result in the early release of the guerrillas who would then resume their activities.

129. (S) This information [redacted] the [redacted] was disseminated as a Sensitive Memorandum report [redacted]

to:

[redacted]



130. (S) October 17, 1983 [redacted] provided additional information [redacted] relating to the execution of nine PRTCH guerrillas. [redacted] sometime between September and early October 1983, nine PRTCH guerrillas were captured and then executed by the Honduran Armed Forces. Three of these guerrillas had been debriefed and displayed for the international news media at a press conference held in Nueva Palestina. The families of the three guerrillas were beginning to inquire about their family members' whereabouts. As a result, the Honduran military hierarchy recognized that it now would face the threat of a disastrous international scandal for human rights violations.

131. (S) CINC Alvarez had reportedly told officers involved in the counterinsurgent operation that he did not expect any more deserters from the remaining guerrillas in the area. The CINC further stated that any guerrillas turning themselves over to the authorities at this stage of the operation would be doing so because they were dying of hunger. It was not known whether the CINC had ordered the executions or lower ranking officers had taken it upon themselves to issue such an order.

132. (S) After being executed, some of the guerrilla bodies were deposited in the Patuca River and were beginning to wash

ashore in populated areas. The Honduran military disclaimed knowledge relating to these bodies.

133. (S) The information was [redacted] disseminated as a Sensitive Memorandum repor[redacted] to: [redacted]

134. (S) [redacted] reportedly believed that Reyes Mata was held for a couple of days before being executed, but he had no evidence to support this belief. Regarding the documents found on Reyes Mata, [redacted] stated that the diary had been found intact. He assumed that the missing pages were removed by high-level officers before the diary was provided to U.S. officials. [redacted] did not know the contents of the missing pages, but indicated that the document was closely held by CINC Alvarez [redacted]

135. [redacted]

[redacted]

136. (S) October 19, 1983 [redacted] Based on the reporting from [redacted] concerning prisoner executions in Olancho, CIA included [redacted] on this topic in the President's [redacted] reported that at least three, and possibly as many as nine, prisoners had been executed after Honduran field units captured and interrogated members of the Cuban-trained guerrilla force that infiltrated from Nicaragua in July 1983.

137. (S) The Carney family was noted to be pressing the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa and local officials for information on the priest's fate and planned to bring the case to congressional attention. An analytical comment indicated that exposure of the incident would focus sharp criticism on Tegucigalpa, which had one of the region's best human rights records.

138. (S) [redacted]

[redacted]

139. (S) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

140. (S) [redacted]

141. (S) Additionally, the Alvarez correspondence addressed issues relating to Carney family requests for a chronology of the insurgents' activities, tactical and administrative information regarding the insurgents and more details on the death of Reyes Mata. With regard to Reyes Mata, it was indicated that he was killed in a confrontation with the "Patuca Task Force" on September 18 near Piedras Azules. Alvarez indicated that the Hondurans did not have confirmation that Carney participated in the insurgency although the guerrillas at the press conference mentioned that he may have died of hunger. Alvarez indicated that he would meet with the Carney family, without the presence of the media, if a request were properly submitted.

142. (S) November 23, 1983 [redacted] with an evaluation of its reporting from October 16 to 31, 1983 and advised [redacted] that the reports concerning the executions of PRTCH insurgents addressed a topic of considerable interest to the intelligence community and were graded as "excellent" and "good." [redacted] reports highlighted the need for [redacted] particularly in light of U.S. involvement in joint military exercises in Honduras. [redacted]

143. (S) November 25, 1983 [redacted] provided information that appeared in a November 25, 1983 *La Tribuna* newspaper article. The article reported that some parents of the guerrillas were beginning to protest because the Honduran authorities would not allow them to visit their sons. Additionally, the article indicated that three of the guerrillas who had been presented to the news media previously had been killed on October 3, 1983 when they reportedly attempted to escape.

144. (S) November 29, 1983 Intelligence Report [redacted] reported that, as of mid-November 1983, CINC Alvarez had initiated

a formal investigation of the alleged theft of approximately $25,000 that had been confiscated during the Olancho Operation.

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

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

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

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



150. (S) March 1, 1984 Headquarters Memorandum. According to a March 1984 OLL Memorandum for the Record, a copy of a February 23 letter addressed to Congressman William S. Broomfield from Virginia Smith, Carney's sister, had been forwarded to DO/LA and DO/PCS, for comment in preparation for a response to Broomfield. The letter alleged that Carney was interrogated, tortured and died or was executed at El Aguacate. The letter further alleged that Carney's interrogation was witnessed by U.S. military and CIA personnel and CINC Alvarez. Ms. Smith detailed her family's efforts in determining the circumstances of the priest's fate and asked that Broomfield investigate the incident.

151. (S) March 2, 1984 Headquarters Memorandum. An OLL Memorandum for the Record described a meeting between HPSCI Staff member Steve Berry and LA Division Chief Duane Clarridge. Berry reportedly advised that the minority members of the HPSCI and House Foreign Affairs Committee were concerned about the February 23, 1984 letter from Carney's sister to Broomfield. According to the memorandum, Clarridge explained that DO/LA was collecting information concerning Carney. Clarridge also told Berry that the letter was not accurate and that insurgents who deserted the group had stated that Carney was emaciated and in a weakened condition. The Honduran Army had subsequently discovered a badly decomposed body of a non-Central American that was lying in a hammock with religious literature near the corpse. Putting all the known facts together, Clarridge reportedly stated, the Hondurans concluded that the body was that of Carney. No efforts were made to recover the body at the time of discovery and later efforts to locate it were unsuccessful. Clarridge offered to allow Agency officer [redacted] who had interviewed three of the deserters, to brief Broomfield on what he had learned about Carney's fate.

152. (S) March 2, 1984 Headquarters Memorandum. In an apparent response to inquiries by DCI Casey, CATF's Special Assistant provided Chief, DO/LA with information concerning the Olancho Operation and Carney. The memorandum, drawn from September 22, 1983 and October 6, 1983 [redacted] reports concerning Carney and the Olancho Operation, stated that reviews of captured documents, debriefings of the insurgents and Honduran studies demonstrated little cause for devoting time and resources to a more in-depth analysis. Regarding Carney, the memorandum stated: [redacted] had substantiated press accounts that Carney had died of starvation. Additionally, prisoner debriefings conducted by the Hondurans revealed that the priest had been carried in relays by the stronger members of his group. Finally, it stated that the Hondurans believed that there was little likelihood that the priest's body would be found.

153. (S) March 13, 1984 Headquarters Memorandum. On March 13, 1984, a meeting was held between Congressman Broomfield, House Foreign Affairs Committee Minority Staff Director Everett Bierman and [redacted] The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Carney. A March 13, 1984 OLL Memorandum for the Record prepared by an OLL representative who also attended indicated that [redacted] spoke for about 20 minutes based on his travel to Honduras, and advised that the deserters had said that the group ran out of food and became primarily concerned with survival rather than anti-regime activities. [redacted] said he learned from the deserters that, three days before the deserters left the group, the priest was in such poor physical condition that he had to be carried. The deserters, said [redacted] doubted that Carney had survived.

154. (S) According to the Memorandum for the Record, [redacted] also said he had learned from the Honduran military that it had come across a body of a non-Central American lying in a hammock. The body was badly decomposed and it was difficult to determine the individual's identity. As some religious materials were found near the hammock, it was assumed that the body was that of the priest.

Because access to the area was very difficult, the Hondurans made no effort to recover the body. When the Honduran Government realized that the priest was an American and that his family was seeking his body, it made an unsuccessful effort to relocate it.

155. (S) Broomfield reportedly explained that he had attempted to obtain from Smith the evidence of U.S. Government complicity in Carney's death that she claimed to have in her possession. However, she had refused to provide such information.

156. (S) August 24, 1984 [redacted] requested [redacted] a copy of an article entitled "The Mysterious Death of Father Carney", from the August 4-11, 1983 edition of *The Nation* newspaper. [redacted] stated that the article indicated that two U.S. military intelligence officers--one named "Wes"--allegedly were involved in the Olancho Operation and that a CIA officer at Aguacate was called "Wescito," meaning "Little Wes."

157. (S) December 31, 1984 [redacted] Prompted by a second letter from the Carney family to DCI Casey, dated December 5, 1984, [redacted] was asked whether it was aware of "Colonel, Major, or Lieutenant West Blank, in charge of U.S. Intelligence at Aguacate, where [Carney] was held; and Major Mark Kelvi, second in command there." It was requested that [redacted] notify [redacted] immediately if anyone fitting these descriptions [redacted] during the period of Carney's death.

158. (S) January 1, 1985 [redacted] In response to the December 31, 1984 [redacted] advised that Carney was never held specifically at El Aguacate or anywhere else. [redacted] did not comment on the individuals referenced as "West Blank" and "Mark Kelvi."

159. (S) January 3, 1985 Headquarters Memorandum. In response to the Carney family's December 5, 1984 correspondence to

DCI Casey, the Director of Public Affairs wrote that the perception that CIA had information that it was unwilling to share with the family was incorrect. The family was informed again that CIA was not involved in Carney's disappearance. Moreover, the family was told that "Blank" and "Kelvi" were never employed by CIA. The family was referred to DoS for assistance in seeking information from the Honduran Government.

160. (S) March 20, 1985 [redacted] was informed that CATF continued to receive congressional inquiries concerning the alleged commission of human rights excesses by the Honduran Government and FDN. As a result, CATF was attempting to determine the validity and scope of these reported abuses by surfacing as many specific cases as possible. Relevant Headquarters' files and press items since January 1, 1981 were being reviewed [redacted] as much information as possible regarding a number of individuals, including several clergymen who had been killed in Honduras. Carney's name was not included.

161. (S) No reporting relevant to the fate of Father Carney or Reyes Mata has been found to have been generated between March 1985 and May 1995.

162. (S) May 26, 1995 [redacted] were provided by Headquarters with detailed background information concerning Carney, based on CIA records and press reports. [redacted] were advised that there were indications that the Carney family had submitted an FOIA request in the past and [redacted] would be further advised when more information was obtained.

163. (S) June 9, 1995 Electronic Messages [redacted] LA Division requested a status report and search for records relating to the family's 1988 FOIA Litigation. A response from the Directorate of Administration's Information, Privacy and

Classification Review Division indicated that 19 documents, consisting of 87 pages, had been released to the family. The FOIA litigation initiated by the family in 1988 had been closed on May 30, 1991.

164. June 12, 1995 Headquarters Draft Response. DO/LA prepared a draft reply to certain allegations made in a June 8, 1995 letter from Congressman Robert G. Torricelli, HPSCI, to the National Security Advisor. Torricelli's letter asserted that information he received indicated that Carney had been captured, held at El Aguacate for interrogation by the 316th Battalion, flown by helicopter to mountains near the Patuca River, and thrown out. Torricelli's letter also alleged that the Honduran military officer responsible for Carney's execution was a paid CIA agent. Additionally, the letter indicated that U.S. intelligence officers were present at the meeting when CINC Alvarez ordered Carney captured and also at Carney's interrogation. Torricelli had also posed questions concerning Carney to CIA officers during a May 23, 1995 briefing of HPSCI members on Guatemalan issues.

165. The DO/LA draft reply indicated that the DO had no relevant information after 1987, but that the DI was being tasked to review its records for additional information. The Torricelli allegations had not been corroborated by a DO/LA review of the 1988 OIG Report of Investigation. [redacted] The National Security Council had previously been provided with a background paper on the 316th Battalion, according to DO/LA, and DO/LA considered the Torricelli allegations to be a restatement of charges that had been made on several occasions since 1984. DCI Deutch advised the National Security Advisor on June 23, 1995 regarding the Torricelli allegations that CIA only learned of Carney's death after it occurred.

166. (S) A June 28, 1995 letter to Torricelli from CIA's Director of Congressional Affairs formally responded to the questions that had been posed by Torricelli at the May 23 briefing and in his June 8, 1995 letter. The response, based on the DO/LA draft, stated that a review of available information indicated that CIA had no knowledge of any plans to capture Carney, only learned of his likely death after it had occurred, and had no direct or indirect involvement in his death. The letter also stated that the circumstances surrounding Carney's death remained uncertain, but that the 1988 OIG investigation had found no CIA involvement in the matter. The letter further noted that the 1988 OIG Report of Investigation had been reviewed by both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees and that they did not take issue with the sections relating to Carney. Finally, the letter stated that CIA had been directed by DCI Deutch to undertake a review of all CIA records that might bear on possible allegations of human rights abuses during the relevant period.

167. (S) June 23, 1995 [redacted] advised that [redacted] to follow-up on information concerning the death of Reyes Mata. [redacted] reportedly provided details of the 1983 Olancho Operation, indicating that the insurgents were tired, hungry and too weak to offer resistance and that captured insurgents were interrogated by members of the SFC [redacted] also indicated that Father Carney was not with the guerrilla group when it encountered the SFC.

168. [redacted] stated that [redacted] was accompanied by other officers, possibly including [redacted] The officers were asked to participate in the execution of insurgents to prove their mettle, but some refused to take part. The SFC reportedly executed 70 of the insurgents in the vicinity of the Patuca River, 20 more "disappeared" and the rest were presented to the press. [redacted] reportedly had shot Reyes Mata in the forehead with a .45 caliber pistol.

169. [redacted] indicated that [redacted] had recently reported that, according to a Honduran military report written at the time of the Olancho Operation, Carney was suffering from malaria.

170. [redacted]

171. [redacted] The information concerning the death of Reyes Mata, Carney's absence from the group when it encountered the SFC, and the Honduran military's belief that he was suffering from malaria was viewed [redacted] as new. [redacted] requested to [redacted] comment to this effect to inform consumers as to why they were being advised of information regarding a 1983 event.

172. (S) ~~June 29, 1995~~ [redacted]

173. (S) June 30, 1995

174. (S) July 3, 1995 Intelligence Report



That analysis, indicated that both Reyes Mata and Carney had died of starvation and malaria and that there had been no confrontation between the insurgents and SFC. The analysis was based on information that initially appeared in the press and did not draw upon first-hand accounts from the participants in the Olancho Operation.

175. (S) The information was



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



176. (S) [redacted] had also claimed that he did not know of Carney's fate, but thought that the priest had separated from the main group as was reported by the official Honduran version of the incident. [redacted] commented that it was probable that the analyst had been given instructions as to the conclusions he should reach and that Honduran Military Intelligence intended to use the analysis to influence public opinion.

177. (S) July 13, 1995 [redacted] Because of the research requirements of the Honduras Working Group, [redacted] or any indication of human rights abuses in general [redacted] for additional information relating to Carney; and [redacted] for background information regarding the 316th Battalion.

178. (S) July 14, 1995 Intelligence Report [redacted] an additional account of Carney's death [redacted] who had reportedly told [redacted] that Carney had been captured, tortured to death and then dismembered by the Honduran

Armed Forces. Pieces of the body were then reportedly buried in various locations near Nueva Palestina in the area of the Patuca River. [redacted] had told [redacted] that she had received this information from insurgents who were with Carney at the time of his capture. It was not specified whether these insurgents actually witnessed the killing of Carney or had only heard about it. [redacted] had also reportedly indicated that Reyes Mata had been captured and killed while in Honduran custody. [redacted] were persistent critics of the Honduran military for alleged human rights abuses.

179. (S) This information was [redacted] disseminated as an Intelligence Report

[redacted]

[redacted]

180. (S) July 20, 1995 Intelligence Report [redacted] according to a 1984 ethics complaint, Reyes Mata and Carney had been killed during an encounter with Honduran Special Forces. The 1984 complaint, filed by an alleged participant in the encounter, accused [redacted] of removing approximately $15,000 from the bodies of several insurgents and not submitting the money to his superiors. [redacted] believed that all documents related to the encounter, including the ethics complaint, had probably been destroyed.

181. [redacted]

182. [redacted]

[redacted]

183. [redacted] stated that his knowledge of the event was based on the ethics complaint and that the "Special Unit" had killed both Reyes Mata and Carney. He said he had been told by friends in the military that Carney was killed. [redacted] indicated that [redacted] information corroborated and added to that [redacted] regarding the ethics complaint.

184. (S) August 15, 1995 Intelligence Report. The information regarding the deaths of Carney and Reyes Mata that had been obtained [redacted] was combined [redacted] with November 1983 U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)/Army Operations Group (AOG) information[4] to form a single intelligence report. The intelligence report indicated that INSCOM had no record of disseminating the 1983 AOG information. This information concerned the execution of Reyes Mata by [redacted] and Carney's body being covered by leaves and left in the jungle by a young guerrilla. Additionally, the combined intelligence report indicated that the Honduran Inspector General was investigating [redacted] for dividing among his troop money seized in the course of the Olancho Operation. Headquarters

[4] (C) The AOG information is discussed in detail in the next section of this Report of Investigation.

commented that the AOG reporting and earlier [redacted] reporting made it appear that Reyes Mata was executed; [redacted] commented that Carney's fate was still unclear.

185. (S) The combined information was disseminated as an Intelligence Report [redacted]

186. (S) September 14, 1995 Congressional Notification. Members of the SSCI, HPSCI, Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and the National Security Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations were notified by CIA officials on September 14, 1995 regarding CIA reporting relating to the death of Carney. According to a September 14, 1995 Office of Congressional Affairs (OCA) background paper, the CIA had received one report, [redacted] indicating that Carney was killed during encounters between the military and the insurgent group. A second report [redacted] indicated that Carney was tortured to death and dismembered by the Hondurans. Other scenarios in earlier CIA reports were that Carney had starved to death or was thrown from a helicopter. The CIA officials reportedly indicated that the Agency had not been able to establish or rule out any of these

accounts. The CIA officials also noted that a full report of the review of CIA activities in Honduras would be provided to the Committees when completed.

187. (S) October 11, 1995 Congressional Notification. Members of the SSCI, HPSCI, Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and the National Security Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations were notified by CIA officials on October 11, 1995 regarding the involvement of [redacted] in the execution of Reyes Mata. The Committees were informed that a recent CIA report indicated that the execution had occurred. This report corroborated 1983 AOG information that had been provided by an AOG source but was not disseminated.

188. (S) The CIA officials reportedly indicated that an October 1983 CIA intelligence report had included the same information and identified [redacted] The CIA officials further indicated that the Honduras Working Group was reviewing all information related to [redacted] to corroborate the reports of his involvement in the execution of Reyes Mata and to identify any link [redacted] might have had to the death of Carney.

189. (S) May 23, 1996 [redacted] had provided information regarding the disappearance of Carney. [redacted] been told that the SFC never saw Carney. Several of the captured insurgents reportedly recovered a pistol and piece of clothing that they said belonged to the priest and these items were turned over to Honduran Military Intelligence [redacted] had indicated that Honduran helicopters were unable to locate Carney based upon information from captured insurgents.

190. (S) [redacted] The leftist told [redacted] that he had entered Honduras with Carney and that the priest was in poor physical condition before the border crossing. The leftist reportedly said that he and others had to carry the priest for two days in a hammock before leaving him behind in the jungle. [redacted] said he did not obtain the leftist's last name and that this individual had since returned to Nicaragua

191. (S) May 31, 1996 Intelligence Report: [redacted] at [redacted] comment was added to the original report, stating that the [redacted] did not say whether the leftist had indicated that Carney was alive or dead when left behind. The information was disseminated as an Intelligence Report [redacted]

[redacted]

192. (S) July 2, 1996 [redacted] The leftist had reportedly told [redacted] that, after carrying Carney in a hammock for two days, the insurgents awoke on the third morning to find that Carney had died in his sleep. The insurgents left Carney's body in the hammock.

193. (S) The [redacted] the helicopter that was dispatched to look for Carney's body after captured insurgents reported his death. [redacted] were unable, according to [redacted] to say exactly where they had searched for the body. [redacted] also reported that a [redacted] who was originally scheduled to travel with Carney's group had described Carney as being in poor physical condition prior to the start of the journey.

194. (S) July 9, 1996 Intelligence Report. This report was issued by CIA as an addendum to the May 31, 1996 Intelligence Report [redacted] It provided the recipients of the previous intelligence report with the additional information [redacted] indicating that Carney had died in his sleep and his body left in a hammock.

195. (S) February 10, 1997 Intelligence Report. [redacted] related that Honduran Special Forces had captured an aide to Carney who was in possession of the priest's stole and chalice. The aide said that he had left Carney in a hammock in the jungle. The guerrillas reportedly had not eaten for more than 20 days and were too weak to carry Carney, who was unable to continue the march. [redacted] said that the Special Forces backtracked with the aide, and found a decomposed body,

identified as Carney by the aide, in the hammock. [redacted] estimated that Carney had been dead for several days. The body was neither recovered nor buried.

196. (S) The information [redacted] was disseminated as an Intelligence Report [redacted]

[redacted]

197. (S) February 11, 1992 [redacted] reporting concerning Carney should be corroborated as quickly as possible.

[redacted]

[redacted]

198. [redacted]

199. (S) [redacted] five patrols that were deployed by helicopter from the Nueva Palestina base camp for the primary purpose of tracking down the guerrillas. The patrols set off from sandbars in the Patuca River in five roughly parallel columns in the general direction of the Nicaraguan border. The aide to Carney was discovered by one of the patrols. [redacted]

200. (S) [redacted] notified the base camp via radio that Carney's body had been found and then continued patrolling for another week. [redacted] did not prepare a written report of this event. [redacted]

201. (S) [redacted]

[redacted] no-one ever asked him about Carney nor does he remember telling anyone about finding the priest.

202. [redacted]

203. (S) February 14, 1997 Intelligence Report. [redacted] former Honduran soldier had told a close confidant that he had participated in a patrol led by [redacted] in 1983. This patrol reportedly traveled to the location of Carney's body and [redacted] ordered the body to be buried at the site. The former Honduran soldier indicated that the burial site was in Olancho Department on Congolon Mountain. [redacted] reportedly commented that the patrol led by [redacted] was probably a follow-up patrol that had been sent to confirm that Carney's body had been found.

204. (S) The information was [redacted] disseminated as an addendum to [redacted]





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
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[redacted] captured a guerrilla carrying a wooden chalice and stole. The guerrilla claimed to be Carney's aide and advised them that he had left Carney lying in a hammock that was protected by dense vegetation. Carney was described by the guerrilla as being too weak to continue with the march.

211. (S) The aide reportedly had led the two patrols to Carney, who had obviously been dead for a few days. The aide identified the body as being Carney and the Lieutenant communicated this to the base camp [redacted] the body showed no signs of trauma or violence and it was apparent that Carney had died of natural causes. [redacted] headed back to the base camp while [redacted] patrol continued to search for an arms cache. Carney's body was left in the hammock. [redacted] commented that the lieutenant probably killed Carney's aide as he was not needed after finding the cache.

212. (S) Subsequent to Carney's body being located, [redacted] CINC Alvarez advised [redacted] that enough prisoners had been taken. [redacted] accompanied four or five captives who were returned to Nueva Palestina from Tegucigalpa. There [redacted] and other officers marched the guerrillas into the jungle and executed them. [redacted] also had executed another captured guerrilla in a separate, but similar, incident.

213. (S) [redacted] estimated that Honduran Special Forces executed between 30 and 40 of the captured guerrillas who were returned to the jungles. In addition to other executions that [redacted] said he witnessed, he reported that he observed an individual [redacted] killing a Nicaraguan advisor to the guerrillas. [redacted] also was reported [redacted] to have participated in the executions

and another officer [redacted] was in charge of the executions. Although initially identifying a [redacted] as having executed Reyes Mata, [redacted] later admitted that he did not know who had performed this act and that Reyes Mata was shot and not drowned.

214. (S) March 3, 1997 Recall/Reissue of Intelligence Reports. [redacted] of [redacted] CIA recalled the February 10, 1997 Intelligence Report [redacted] and the related February 14, 1997 addendum. The report and addendum were reissued on March 4, 1997 with the following Headquarters caveat:

> The following report is a reissue. . . . [S]ince issuing the report, we have learned that the source may not have been honest in his account of the events detailed in the intelligence report. . . . Consumers will wish to ensure that any finished intelligence publications that drew on this report are edited as appropriate.

215. (S) February 27, 1997 Intelligence Report [redacted] information concerning the planned excavation by the Hondurans of a mass grave that purportedly contained the remains of Carney. [redacted] The Honduran citizen claimed that he had been part of an insurgent group that included Carney and Reyes Mata. The citizen claimed that he had evaded the Honduran military and witnessed them prepare a mass grave for between 70 and 90 of his deceased comrades in the Nueva Segovia region. [redacted]

216. (S) This information was [redacted] disseminated as an Intelligence [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

217. (S) IG Interview of [redacted] says that the SFC reported directly to CINC Alvarez and was based at La Venta Military Base. [redacted]

[redacted]

218. (S) During training, [redacted] recalls that SFC officers were ordered to participate in an operation to capture the guerrillas after two had deserted the group. [redacted] orders were to search and stop the group—"capture" as opposed to "search and destroy." All SFC officers and approximately 120 soldiers attached to the Air Mobile Unit quickly deployed to Nueva Palestina.

219. (S) After finding a guerrilla during a routine supply mission, more guerrillas were located, captured and sent to Tegucigalpa for questioning and propaganda purposes. According to [redacted] most of the guerrillas were in poor physical condition and suffering from starvation. [redacted] states that these individuals, numbering approximately 20, were not tortured. He notes that torturing them would not have served the Hondurans well as the guerrillas were to be presented to the press.

220. (S) After approximately 20 days of being in the field, [redacted] and three or four guerrillas to Tegucigalpa. [redacted] met with CINC Alvarez privately. After the meeting, [redacted] and the guerrillas headed back to Nueva Palestina in a helicopter. [redacted] told [redacted] that "We have to make them disappear." [redacted] said that the guerrillas were to "die in combat or be executed after we get information from them and in a place they can't be found." Only officers were to be involved in carrying out the executions and each officer had to participate so that they would not disclose their actions. [redacted] an individual [redacted] was given overall responsibility by [redacted] for ensuring that the executions were performed by each officer.

221. (S) [redacted] an SFC Lieutenant [redacted] that he had captured and executed Reyes Mata. [redacted] states that Reyes Mata was interrogated by senior SFC officers, including [redacted] says he was not present for the interrogation or execution.

222. (S) The two original deserters had indicated that Carney, referred to as "Father Guadalupe," was traveling with the insurgents. [redacted] states that Honduran military intelligence had a large file on Carney and that CINC Alvarez was eager to use him for propaganda purposes. This desire stemmed from pressure the Catholic Church had applied on CINC Alvarez for his perceived mistreatment of the Church and its representatives. [redacted] indicates that there was never an order to kill Carney, only to capture him alive and bring him back to the camp. [redacted] emphasized the importance of capturing Father Guadalupe alive and offered a week of leave to the patrol that found and returned the priest to Nueva Palestina.

223. (S) At some point in the operation, [redacted] ordered [redacted] to assemble a patrol and assist another patrol that was in the field. [redacted] collected approximately 15 men, located the first patrol, and they then came into contact with an individual who identified himself as the aide to Carney. The individual had in his possession [redacted] a carved wooden chalice and a stole and indicated that Carney was weakened by a lack of food, was unable to continue the march, and was left hanging in a hammock in the jungle. The individual led the patrols to the hammock [redacted] where a badly decomposed body was found and presumed to be the body of Carney due to the story told by the individual. [redacted] believes that the leader of the primary patrol radioed back to the base camp and reported the find.

224. (S) After observing the body [redacted] the patrols departed the area and the first group continued its mission of seeking out arm caches while traveling towards Nicaragua. This patrol may have taken along and executed the individual claiming to be Carney's aide.

225. (S) [redacted] did not return Carney's body to Nueva Palestina because it was badly decomposed. [redacted] The first patrol did not return Carney's body to the base camp as it was ordered to continue patrolling.

226. (S) Subsequently [redacted] advised CINC Alvarez that [redacted] had stolen money from the guerrillas and that [redacted] had received some of the proceeds. The CINC became upset [redacted] and reassigned [redacted] because of this theft. [redacted] was the "field commander" for the operation.

227. (S) [redacted] does not recall any CIA personnel specifically requesting information from him regarding the Olancho Operation or the fate of Carney until 1997. [redacted] added that, after approximately a two-month period in 1983, interest in the Olancho Operation diminished quickly—there were other issues to address and the operation was considered a military success.

228. (S) May 30, 1997 [redacted]

CONCLUSION

229. (S) [redacted] produced timely and substantial intelligence on the Olancho Operation, including relevant information regarding Reyes Mata and Carney:

- An October 15, 1983 [redacted] indicated that [redacted] said that prisoners captured during the Olancho Operation had been executed by Honduran Army officers and that Reyes Mata was among those executed. The executions reportedly were initiated after the "field commander" in Olancho—not otherwise identified—received an order from the Honduran Armed Forces General Staff to "search and destroy." An October 17, 1983 [redacted] indicated [redacted] confirmed the earlier report and added that Reyes Mata was held for a couple of days before being executed. Neither of these reports contained the identities of the alleged executioners or any information regarding the fate of Carney.

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

- On November 23, 1983 [redacted] to report on any repercussions related to the

prisoner executions. [redacted] to collect [redacted] on the Olancho Operation were hampered [redacted] Thus, no further relevant information was acquired [redacted] time.

- [redacted] was told [redacted] in late 1994 or early 1995 that Carney was either dead or near death when [redacted] happened upon him while patrolling the jungle during the 1983 Olancho Operation. [redacted] confirmed the accuracy of the reported information.

- [redacted] additional information from [redacted] regarding the fate of Father Carney. [redacted]

230. [redacted] or information regarding Carney on three occasions between September 1983 and July 1995:

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

- [redacted] information [redacted] July 1995.

Despite these efforts, however, the precise fate of Carney remains unknown to CIA.

[redacted]

231. (S) [redacted]

232. (S) [redacted]

233. (S) [redacted]

234. (S) [redacted]

[redacted]

235. (S) [redacted]

236. (S) [redacted]

237. (S) [redacted]

238. (S) [redacted]

[redacted]

239. (S) [redacted] He was under the supervision [redacted] recalls that the relationship [redacted] was cordial and [redacted] enjoyed an excellent relationship [redacted]

240. (S) In August 1983, [redacted] sought [redacted] assistance and advised him that they would be traveling to Nueva Palestina as two PRTC guerrillas had turned themselves in to Honduran authorities. [redacted] recalls that [redacted] advised him before their departure that it was possible that the guerrilla group might include a U.S. citizen. [redacted]

241. (S) [redacted] recalls that the Honduran SFC, [redacted] had been charged with finding and neutralizing the guerrillas. [redacted] says he interviewed six to eight captured insurgents, but is uncertain whether these guerrillas had deserted. They were interviewed in a coercion-free environment. Two guerrillas claimed to [redacted] that they were the last to have seen Carney, whom they referred to as "Padre Guadalupe," alive.

242. (S) Two insurgents indicated that Carney had made it, in the company of the PRTC insurgent group, to a base camp on top of a hill between the Coco and Patuca Rivers after eight days of marching. Traveling down the hill in a northwesterly direction, Carney was described by the two guerrillas as being so weak that he could only cover approximately 100 meters in the triple canopy jungle before

requiring rest. Before reaching the Patuca River, Carney reportedly had to be assisted, sometimes carried, by the two insurgents. The insurgents reportedly expressed a fear of capture and Carney urged them to continue without him. They then placed the priest in a hammock and left. The guerrillas believed, says [redacted] that Carney had died of exposure and starvation.

243. (S) In addition to suffering from lack of food and the elements, Carney was described by the guerrillas who were interviewed by [redacted] as being spiritually broken. [redacted] recalls learning from the captives that Carney had ministered to the insurgents but came to odds with Reyes Mata who prohibited Carney from performing religious services. According to [redacted] Carney was also emotionally affected by Reyes Mata's execution of a member of the group.

244. (S) Initially, it was hoped that Carney was alive and would be captured. After [redacted] interviewed the deserters, however, he recalls that the conclusion within the Embassy was that Carney had died of starvation. There was never any indication, says [redacted] that the Hondurans had captured or killed the priest. By the end of 1983, no information had been identified that contradicted this conclusion and the [redacted] began to focus on other matters.

245. (S) [redacted] says he prepared several intelligence reports based on his findings and the subsequent discovery by the Hondurans of religious articles that apparently belonged to Carney. [redacted] recalls that [redacted] and [redacted] made inquiries of the Honduran military at the time concerning the fate of Carney.

246. (S) After [redacted]' initial involvement, [redacted] reportedly assumed full responsibility for reporting on matters relating to the Olancho Operation. [redacted] suspected, but never had Honduran Army confirmation, that Reyes Mata may have been captured and subsequently killed by the Hondurans. These

suspicions arose after a picture of the dead Reyes Mata appeared in the media wearing a uniform that appeared to have been surprisingly fresh and clean for someone who had been on the run in the jungle for weeks. [redacted] advised that these pictures appeared after he was assigned other duties and, thus, [redacted] would have followed-up on the suspicions. [redacted] subsequently was killed in an automobile accident [redacted]

247. (S) [redacted] says that the Embassy was cautious in not reporting street rumors or unverified information on issues that might be politically volatile. [redacted] has no reason to believe that the Embassy or its components, including the [redacted] suppressed any intelligence reporting.

248. (S) [redacted] indicates that the Olancho insurgency was not of crucial interest or viewed seriously [redacted] because the group did not present a threat to U.S. or Honduran interests, [redacted] was consumed with the Contra program, and [redacted] was interested in the insurgency and intensely involved in reporting related details. The insurgency was viewed [redacted] in a broad sense—an ill conceived, badly implemented operation, wherein the insurgents paid the price for self-destructive behavior. Many of the insurgents and Carney were thought to have succumbed to exposure and starvation.

249. (S) [redacted] recalls that the Carney family visited the Embassy but [redacted] was not involved with them. [redacted] believes that Tegucigalpa Embassy's Consular Section would have been responsible for pursuing Carney's fate, given his presumed status as a U.S. citizen. [redacted] also indicates [redacted] the Embassy did not [redacted] for further collection on the fate of Carney or Reyes Mata. [redacted] as it was thought that Carney had vanished in the jungle and died of starvation and disease.

250. (S) [redacted] states that the Hondurans provided [redacted] with the official account of the Olancho Operation and [redacted] did not question that version. [redacted] Questioning them further would have indicated a lack of trust and not necessarily resulted in the truth. [redacted] did not do more in this regard [redacted] because the Olancho Operation did not seem to be a major issue. [redacted]

251. (S) [redacted]

252. (S) [redacted] had indicated that Father Carney was left to die in a hammock because he was suffering from starvation and was too weak to continue. Carney was reported to be by far the oldest member of the insurgent group and the account of his fate appeared to be plausible. [redacted] assumed that he was dead, [redacted] that other individuals, mainly Contras, had suffered the same fate in the Honduran jungles and this added to the credibility of the account [redacted] interest in Carney was equal to its interest in the fate of Reyes Mata, but there was no information left to pursue in the Carney matter. [redacted] reported everything it knew about the Olancho Operation.

253. (S) [redacted] viewed the Olancho Operation as a large-scale overt military operation. As such, [redacted] was largely responsible for reporting on the event. [redacted] the information concerning Carney dying of natural causes was credible then and now. As a result, there was no further reporting on the priest's fate after it was determined that he had likely died of starvation.

254. (S) [redacted] did not purposely exclude the identity of the "field commander" who was referred to in [redacted] October 15, 1983 report as responsible for prisoner executions. [redacted] reports on the executions were damaging to Honduras and did not protect anyone. [redacted]

255. (S) [redacted] did not have a significant interest in the Olancho Operation as there was not a great amount of policy interest. [redacted]

256. [redacted]

257. (S) [redacted] became aware of the 1983 Olancho Operation from accounts carried in the Honduran media. SFC officers [redacted] were summoned to pursue the insurgents. During the short-lived operation, [redacted] recalls that insurgents surrendered and gave details of the group's history and make-up. This included a description of a priest identified as Father Guadalupe. [redacted] did not realize that this priest was Carney until after his family contacted the U.S. Embassy for assistance and media articles described his participation in the PRTCH guerrilla penetration.

258. (S) [redacted] that information relating to the Olancho Operation [redacted] and that [redacted] personnel provided information [redacted] regarding the operation. [redacted] personnel were described [redacted] as being very enthusiastic about collecting information concerning this military action and were considered to be the reporting focal point for it within the Embassy.

259. (S) [redacted] traveled by vehicle to an unspecified location outside of Tegucigalpa and talked with captured guerrillas. The guerrillas appeared to be in good health and told of being trained in Cuba and sent through the jungle of Olancho. Once in the jungle, they ran out of food and the leader of the group sent two or three individuals to a village to obtain supplies. These guerrillas were detected and the Hondurans mounted a military operation. The captured guerrillas [redacted] also mentioned that a priest accompanied the group and died of starvation. [redacted] says he can no longer recall the name the prisoners used to refer to the priest.

260. (S) [redacted]

[redacted] recalls visiting [redacted] and sorting through bags of seized documents and photographs taken by the guerrillas. He says the photographs were worn, dirty and greasy. Among the photographs were pictures of guerrillas who were obviously starving and in bad physical shape. [redacted] says that some of these individuals appeared to be dead and he attributed their death to starvation.

261. (S) [redacted] recalls one photograph, possibly black and white, that pictured the body of a male lying in a hammock. The individual was approximately 50-55 years of age, with grayish hair and a long face. [redacted] he concluded at the time that the individual had died of starvation. The photograph also showed a "purple stole," although [redacted] does not recall whether this item was on the hammock, the individual, or the ground. [redacted] he believed this individual to have been Carney, although he is unsure of how he came to this conclusion.

262. (S) [redacted] recalls that the Hondurans were not showing an interest in the seized items and he pointed out the photograph of the individual in the hammock to a Combined Military Intelligence (C-2) officer. He recalls doing so because he was aware that the Carney family had expressed its suspicions to the Embassy concerning the priest's fate and its belief that it was not receiving adequate cooperation from U.S. representatives. He believes that the photograph indicated that the priest had died of starvation and emphasizes that it would have forced the family to accept that Carney had died of natural causes in the jungle. [redacted] believes that this photograph was provided to Carney's relatives by DoS personnel at the Embassy.

263. (S) [redacted] has no specific recollection of reporting or recording the information relating to the photograph he thinks may have been of Carney. However, he says he regularly

passed such information to Embassy officials, given the high profile of the case. He believes that this information was used to brief the Carney family. [redacted] maintains that neither [redacted] nor Embassy management ever sought to suppress the dissemination of any information on this or other events. [redacted]

264. (S) [redacted] was not able to identify photographs of Carney from the Honduran media as bearing a resemblance to the individual he recalls was photographed lying in the hammock. Nor can [redacted] plain how a photograph of a deceased Carney could have been taken and developed by the Honduran guerrillas in the Olancho jungle. He believes that it is possible that he is mistaken in his identification of the individual as Carney. [redacted] ecalls that there was a lot of misinformation concerning the Olancho Operation.

265. [redacted]

266. (S) [redacted]

[redacted]" He was assisted in this assignment by locally-hired Hondurans who referred to him as "Wes" and "Commandante Wes."

267. (S) When the Olancho Operation began [redacted] recalls that the Honduran Armed Forces set up a staging area at the Air Base where supplies were stored and then trucked to the Tinto River. The staging area consisted of a few tents and was staffed by logistical personnel from the Honduran Armed Forces. He says he discouraged his personnel from interacting with the individuals assigned to the staging area and indicates that there was no reason to have contact with them.

268. (S) After the staging area was established, one of [redacted] Honduran assistants advised him that a truckload of guerrillas had been brought to the area and then transported to Comayagua [redacted] says he never saw these prisoners and advises that the staging area did not have any detention facilities. He also says he is unaware of what happened to the prisoners. Upon completion of the counterinsurgent operation, the staging area was disassembled.

269. (S) Prior to the Olancho Operation, [redacted] advises that a group of U.S. newspaper reporters traveled to Lepaterique looking for an American known as "Commandante West." [redacted] believes that the inquiry related to him and opines that the reporters had apparently confused the name of "Wes" with "West." In reaction to this inquiry [redacted] says he returned to [redacted] does not recall any additional references to an individual called "West." He also says he has no knowledge of a "West Blank" or "Mark Kelvi" serving in Honduras.

270. (S) [redacted] say that they were not aware of prisoners being held or interrogated at El Aguacate Air Base during the Olancho

Operation. [redacted] indicates that the only support provided by the U.S. military in the Olancho Operation was when two U.S. helicopters delivered C-rations to Nueva Palestina from Palmerola, an Air Base in Comayagua. He says the U.S. helicopters, sent by the U.S. Military Group, stayed on the ground for approximately one hour while delivering the food and departed the area without providing further assistance.

271. [redacted]

272. (S) [redacted] recalls a discussion with [redacted] between August 1994 and August 1995 regarding Carney's fate. [redacted] recalls that he had previously learned from local newspapers that Carney allegedly had been murdered. According to [redacted] indicated that he had not participated in the Olancho Operation, but that [redacted] had been involved. [redacted] had come upon Carney while on a patrol and that Carney was either dead or near death at the time. If the latter, the Honduran patrol had left him to die, [redacted] is not certain whether [redacted] told him that Carney was dead or left to die, but does not recall being provided any information that would indicate that Carney was murdered.

273. (S) [redacted]

[redacted]

274. [redacted]

275. [redacted]

276. [redacted]

277. [redacted]



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

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

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



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

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288.

[redacted] recalls that Carney had reportedly died of exposure and that most of the guerrillas had also suffered the same fate prior to the Hondurans finding them. [redacted] says he was not privy to the October 15 and 17, 1983 [redacted] Reports regarding prisoner executions and does not recall executions having taken place during the insurgency or what specific actions were taken to clarify the priest's fate.

289. [redacted]

290. (S) [redacted] to be forthcoming and willing to assist him with whatever avenues he decided to pursue. There were no restrictions placed on [redacted] pursuit of information. Initially [redacted] was provided with seized documents for his review. The most substantive document was a copy of the diary belonging to Reyes Mata. The other materials were considered to be mostly propaganda and of little use. [redacted] traveled to the Olancho Department for one day and was accompanied [redacted]

291. (S) During the trip to Olancho [redacted] where 15 to 30 captured insurgents were seated in a circle of chairs. He says the prisoners were clean, lacking visible signs of physical mistreatment, well fed, without chains, and dressed in military fatigues. There was

an armed guard present during this general questioning session and only a few of the prisoners talked. They spoke of being starved while in the field and of wanting to surrender. They surrendered when the Hondurans encouraged such action with leaflets and messages broadcast from an airplane.

292. (S) [redacted] he could talk with any of the prisoners as he desired and this resulted in his interviewing three or four insurgents individually. During discussions about the group's leadership [redacted] says he learned that the group had included a "Guatemalan priest." The priest was not identified by any name, nor was he described as a U.S. citizen. The priest was said to be accompanying the group's leader, Reyes Mata, and suffering from malnutrition. He was further described as being in the worst physical state of all members of the group. Reyes Mata reportedly ordered that the priest be carried and one insurgent indicated that the priest would die because of his failing state of health. [redacted] indicates that he did not have prior information concerning the priest, nor did he develop enough information during the interview to cause him to focus on this individual.

293. (S) [redacted] says that [redacted] he was informed that Carney's family had made inquiries at the U.S. Embassy. It was at this time that [redacted] made the association between the priest described by the insurgents and Carney. [redacted] analyzed the diary of Reyes Mata, but says he did not find any noticeable references to Carney. [redacted] found the diary to be consistent with the prisoners' stories in regard to the hardships that the group endured. [redacted] says he was provided with information [redacted] to assist in his review [redacted] also obtained additional seized documents, some of which were signed by "Father Guadalupe," but these, says [redacted] were not helpful in his review as they were considered to be propaganda.

294. (S) [redacted] recalls questioning [redacted] about the bodies of Carney and Reyes Mata.

[redacted] advised that the bodies were not recovered due to the inability of the patrols to carry the bodies through the rough and inaccessible terrain while also carrying their own equipment. Additionally, [redacted] believes the patrols probably were not inclined to recover the decomposing bodies of individuals who had threatened the security of their country [redacted] also advised [redacted] that Reyes Mata had died in a firefight and that it was believed that Carney had starved. [redacted] answers made sense, says [redacted] does not recall seeing any pictures of the bodies of Carney or Reyes Mata.

295. [redacted] was asked to meet with Congressman Broomfield several months after completing the October 1983 analysis of the Olancho Operation. As [redacted] remembers it, Broomfield had been contacted by Carney's family which was seeking an appointment with the President. The family claimed that it had a signed affidavit, and possibly a tape indicating that CIA had ordered the priest's death. [redacted] says he had no knowledge of any prisoner executions at the time and that he advised Broomfield of what he had learned about Carney.

296. (S) [redacted] was shown the October 15 and October 17, 1983 [redacted] reports regarding prisoner executions. He says that he had not seen the documents before and believes that "[CIA] had this information [regarding prisoner executions] before I went to Congress and no one told me. I should have been told as the designated expert [on Carney]." [redacted] cautions that this information may not have been purposely withheld from him, as CATF was an extremely busy place. [redacted] states that, even if all the information had been shared with him, it would not have changed his conclusion that Carney starved to death, but would have created "a little doubt in my mind" concerning the fate of Carney and Reyes Mata. [redacted] says that he did not sense that [redacted] had deliberately withheld information on this subject from him. [redacted] emphasizes that every piece of information that he had collected or reviewed indicated that Carney had died of starvation.

297. (S) [redacted] recalls that efforts were made by CIA to collect information on the circumstances surrounding Carney's disappearance in order to answer anticipated questions from the oversight committees. He believes that relevant information was provided only by [redacted]. After initial reporting by CIA, he recalls that DoS was responsible for follow-up reporting on matters relating to Carney since he was a U.S. citizen.

298. (S) [redacted] notes that there was significant interest during his tenure in alleged human rights abuses. This resulted in an experienced [redacted] representative being assigned as [redacted] with responsibility for monitoring human rights. He says this allowed CATF to review human rights allegations prior to the receipt of official inquiries from senior CIA management and Congress. [redacted] had no recollection of matters relating to Carney arising during his tenure in [redacted].

299. (S) [redacted] was the individual primarily responsible for preparing congressional testimony and correspondence that originated in CATF. She recalls tremendous scrutiny of the Contra initiative and a politically charged atmosphere. As a result, [redacted] took great care in drafting congressional responses as she did not want to take any action that could negatively affect covert action funding. Thus, she says congressional inquiries were interpreted and answered narrowly.

300. (S) During the winter of 1983, she recalls that HPSCI Chairman Edward Boland requested information from CIA concerning the fate of Carney. [redacted] initiated Headquarters traces and queried [redacted]. It was determined, she recalls, that Carney had died from starvation while marching through

the jungles. According to [redacted] all information available within CIA at the time was provided to Boland. She says there was never cause to believe that Carney had been executed.

301. (S) During her tenure in [redacted] recalls receiving several additional congressional inquiries concerning Carney's fate that were substantially identical to previous requests. She says that the Agency responses to these requests were based on previous Agency responses. If the substance of the questions differed from previous requests, then additional research was performed before providing an answer. [redacted] says she was never limited in the amount of research that she could do to answer congressional inquiries.

302. (S) The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) analyst who was responsible for Honduran issues recalls reviewing a report [redacted] in October 1983 concerning executions that occurred during the Olancho Operation. She recalls that the Operation had ended prior to her assignment. Based on at least this CIA report and DoS reports, she says she prepared the October 19, 1983 [redacted] article concerning prisoner executions in Honduras. From an analyst's perspective, she says the identities of the executioners were not necessary in order to ensure that policy makers understood the event. The DI analyst does not recall there being any issues regarding Carney's fate during her assignment.

WHAT OTHER [redacted] REPORTED RELEVANT INFORMATION REGARDING REYES MATA AND CARNEY? [redacted] TO FOLLOW-UP ON NON-CIA REPORTING CONCERNING REYES MATA AND CARNEY? WHAT DO CIA AND OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL RECALL REGARDING THIS NON-CIA REPORTING?

(U) Relevant Reporting and Follow-Up Regarding Reyes Mata and Carney

303. (S) [redacted] INSCOM, Army Operational Group (AOG), Fort Meade, Maryland, maintained a [redacted] relationship with [redacted] during the 1980s. [redacted] initially came to AOG's attention in July 1980 while attending the [redacted] having been selected to assume a position on the [redacted]

304. (S) After a six-month period of assessment and development, [redacted] agreed to function as [redacted] The relationship was fully coordinated with CIA Headquarters [redacted] with [redacted]

305. (S) [redacted] Additionally, CIA was to be kept fully informed of all intelligence production and significant developments in the operation [redacted] Also during 1981, [redacted]

240391 [redacted]

306. (S) During the first half of 1982, [redacted]

307. (S) In October 1982, the [redacted] briefed [redacted] on the [redacted] its intended goals and information obtained from debriefings. At that time [redacted] reportedly advised the [redacted] officer of "... subjects that were sensitive in the eyes of [Ambassador Negroponte] and asked that if [redacted] picked up anything regarding anti-Sandinista activities, corruption and terrorism, could they please let [redacted] know [redacted]

308. (S) [redacted] Initial Reporting. [redacted]

[redacted]

309. [redacted]

310. [redacted]

311. [redacted] provided an [redacted] officer with information relating to the Olancho Operation indicating tha[redacted]ad shot insurgent leader Reyes Mata with a service pistol after his capture and CINC Alvarez had probably been consulted. This information was sent for informational purposes [redacted] to numerous organizations, [redacted] However, it was never disseminated as an intelligence report.

312. (S) [redacted] provided [redacted] with additional information regarding executions during the Olancho Operation [redacted] According to [redacted] this information provided a [redacted] for reports that [redacted] had personally killed Reyes Mata. Regarding Father Carney, [redacted] indicated that only a young guerrilla who had accompanied the priest saw Carney dead, purportedly covered his body with leaves and left it in the jungle. According to [redacted], the guerrilla was subsequently killed. [redacted] indicated [redacted] was under investigation for the theft of money from the guerrillas. This money was reportedly split between [redacted] and his troops each time they killed or captured a guerrilla.

313. (S) [redacted]

314. (S) Between October 1983 and June 1984, [redacted] provided information to [redacted] in response to [redacted]

315. (S) [redacted] In the

following month, [redacted] prepared, fully coordinated and published [redacted] first intelligence report at the Embassy. During this same month, the [redacted] handling [redacted] expressed his belief that he ". . . detected a reluctance on the part of the Embassy [redacted] personnel to publish information regarding discontent/turmoil within the [Honduran] armed forces for fear of political repercussion [affecting funding votes in Congress] in the U.S."

316. (S) Subsequently, three reports obtained from [redacted] in August 1984 were determined [redacted] to be inaccurate and were precluded from publication by [redacted]

317. (S) In November 1984, DIA analysts praised [redacted] reporting. [redacted] continued to be met by the [redacted] officer during 1985 and draft intelligence reports based upon his information were provided to [redacted] for coordination within the Embassy. According to [redacted] records, several of [redacted] reports during 1984 and 1985 were identified as "politically sensitive" by the Embassy, which requested either their non-publication or restricted dissemination.

318. (S) CIA Response to [redacted] Reporting. A November 21, 1983 [redacted] to a November 18, 1983 Joint Chiefs of Staff message disseminating a draft [redacted] intelligence report concerning the capture and execution of a Honduran guerrilla. [redacted] originally sent the draft report for comment to [redacted] and USCINCSO, and for information to DIA, on November 17, 1983. On November 18, 1983, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the draft, for informational purposes, to elements within CIA, State Department, Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and NSA. Within CIA, the draft was electronically distributed to various components within the DI. Additionally, copies of the draft

were distributed to elements within the Directorate of Administration, the Directorate of Science and Technology and the DO.

319. (S) The draft [redacted] intelligence report specifically named [redacted] having killed Reyes Mata some days after his capture in Olancho. It also indicated that CINC Alvarez was consulted before and after the execution. Reyes Mata reportedly had $500,000 in his possession that [redacted] confiscated and split with the CINC.

320. (S) [redacted] disseminated two Sensitive Memoranda regarding prisoner executions during the Olancho Operation on October 19, 1983, but that [redacted] could neither name the executioner nor state whether a higher authority was aware of or had approved the executions. [redacted] belief that some Honduran military officers were not supportive of CINC Alvarez and that some of the information contained in the draft [redacted] report might have been designed to smear him. However, the basic information conveyed in the draft [redacted] report—that prisoners had been executed—could not be refuted, according to [redacted]

321. (S) [redacted] said he had obtained the information that was included in the draft [redacted] report from an unspecified officer who witnessed the execution. The draft [redacted] report said [redacted] would not elaborate on the specific rumor that he had executed Reyes Mata, although [redacted] that CINC Alvarez had commended him on a job well done in the Olancho Operation. Alvarez was reported to be fearful that Reyes Mata would seek revenge against him because of a mid-1970 incident during which Alvarez, then commanding the 4th Infantry Battalion,

purportedly threw Reyes Mata from a cliff. Reyes Mata survived the fall and developed a strong hatred for Alvarez.

322. [redacted]

323. (S) [redacted] Response. On November 25, 1983, [redacted] sent its comments to the [redacted] Commander with informational copies to DIA, INSCOM and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It indicated that the Honduran military had advised that Reyes Mata was killed in combat on September 18, 1983 while operating in Northern Olancho. Two days prior to Reyes Mata's death, according to the [redacted] comment, the local press carried articles alleging that he had been captured. Although this was denied by Honduran authorities, the press stories led to unsubstantiated rumors that Reyes Mata had been captured, interrogated and then shot by members of the Special Squadron. According to [redacted], these rumors had not been confirmed. [redacted]

324. (S) [redacted] response also indicated that it had learned [redacted] that Reyes Mata had been in possession of approximately $25, 000 in local currency that had been, at the direction of CINC Alvarez, divided among all members of the Special Squadron. [redacted] said it was unable to locate in its files any

reference to CINC Alvarez having thrown Reyes Mata off a cliff. In summary, [redacted] comment noted that the remoteness of the Olancho region and the secrecy of the operation generated a number of rumors. In [redacted] opinion, [redacted] did not have direct access to the information concerning Reyes Mata's death and probably was repeating rumors.

325 [redacted]

326. (S) [redacted] Additional Reporting. On February 16, 1984, DO [redacted] received a photocopy and English translation of [redacted] produced by [redacted] and transcribed on November 23, 1983. [redacted] indicated in the message that he had talked with an individual [redacted] According to [redacted] advised that [redacted] had personally killed Reyes Mata after his interrogation provided no significant information.

327. (S) In regard to Carney, [redacted] stated only that a young guerrilla who accompanied the priest had seen him dead. The guerrilla covered the priest with leaves and left him in the jungle. The guerrilla was subsequently killed [redacted] also said that [redacted] split money confiscated from Reyes Mata with his officers and troops each time they killed or captured a guerrilla. The Honduran Inspector General was reportedly conducting an

investigation into the theft of the confiscated money. This information was forwarded to [redacted] on February 17, 1984.

328. (S) [redacted] provided additional details concerning [redacted] opinion of [redacted] reporting of prisoner executions during the Olancho Operation. The [redacted] included comments reportedly made by [redacted] between March and April 1984:

> At the request of CIA, [redacted] did not follow-up on [the Intelligence Information Report regarding capture and assassination of Reyes Mata] during the Olancho anti-guerrilla operation. [redacted] told [redacted] that as far as [redacted] was concerned, [redacted] reporting was right on track except for the amount of money that they calculated to be in the neighborhood of $80-90,000 . . . . [redacted] They considered it an internal matter that had been taken care of by the Armed Forces Command; [redacted] had been replaced and changes in policy had been made. The principal interest was to avoid any recurrence of the abuses that had taken place during Olancho.

329. (S) [redacted] further indicated that [redacted] raised the subject of prisoner executions again during a subsequent meeting with [redacted] At that time, [redacted] advised that [redacted] had admitted to killing Reyes Mata and was upset about [redacted] indicated that the general speculation concerning the confiscated money was that it was split between [redacted] the Honduran Forces Chief of Staff and CINC Alvarez.

(U) Recollections of Relevant Personnel

330. (S) [redacted] The [redacted] who was responsible for handling [redacted] during the relevant time frame says that all matters concerning [redacted] were coordinated with

[redacted] including travel approval, the eventual submission of reports and briefings on collected information. He specifically recalls dealing with [redacted] on issues relating to [redacted]

331. (S) During mid- to late 1983, [redacted] says [redacted] During a November 1983 visit to Tegucigalpa while details of the Olancho Operation were appearing in the local media, the [redacted] debriefed [redacted] on this event. [redacted] reportedly said [redacted] executed Reyes Mata and had stolen money obtained from the captured guerrillas. CINC Alvarez was thought to have received some of the money and to have ordered the executions. When [redacted] briefed unrecalled individuals [redacted] he was advised that this information was not consistent with [redacted]

332. (S) As a result of this [redacted] says he recontacted [redacted] and advised him that the reported information was not accurate. [redacted] requested another meeting and brought with him a Honduran [redacted] who said he had witnessed the execution of Reyes Mata by [redacted] and confirmed the information that the [redacted] had been provided previously by [redacted]. On this basis, [redacted] prepared a draft intelligence report that was provided [redacted] for coordination. [redacted] was tasked for further information on the Olancho Operation and this later resulted in the November 1983 [redacted]

333. (S) [redacted] advising him that [redacted] could not support dissemination of the draft intelligence report as it would disrupt [redacted] says he interpreted these initiatives as being Contra-related. [redacted] says he believed that he had fulfilled his reporting obligation in this matter. Thus, he did not further address the dissemination

issue because [redacted]

334. (S) [redacted] says he did not know until 1996 that the draft 1983 [redacted] report had not been disseminated. He believes that the Embassy Country Team in Honduras wanted reports on subjects such as this to be benign "as to avoid Congress looking over its shoulders" and to keep Congress satisfied with the ongoing implementation of U.S. policy. [redacted] also says he believes that the draft 1983 [redacted] report was "suppressed" by elements within the Embassy, including [redacted] for political reasons. Reporting murders, executions and corruption, says [redacted] would reflect negatively on Honduras and not be beneficial in carrying out U.S. policy. He still believes that the information he obtained from [redacted] was accurate.

335. (S) The [redacted] says he did not have the opportunity to review [redacted] reporting on the Olancho Operation at the time. After receipt of the November 1983 [redacted] and a possible follow-up meeting with [redacted] to discuss the information it contained, [redacted] says he was not tasked to collect further information relating to the insurgency. The major focus for [redacted] in 1983, according to [redacted] was on collecting foreign intelligence, [redacted] and not on human rights abuses.

336. (S) [redacted] during 1983 recalls the general subject matter of the draft [redacted] report--executions and stolen money--and indicates that sending it to the Embassy for comment was routine. [redacted] says he believes that the Embassy in Tegucigalpa was sensitive to all reporting on matters internal to Honduras due to the political climate at the time.

337. (S) [redacted] believes that [redacted] reporting did not receive fair treatment from components within the Embassy, to include [redacted] personnel. He recalls that [redacted] comments on [redacted] reporting, in most instances, were merely a mirror of State's negative sentiments. [redacted] recalls a discussion with [redacted] circa 1983 wherein the latter indicated that unspecified individuals at the Embassy did not want information concerning human rights abuses during the Olancho Operation to be disseminated because it was viewed as an internal Honduran matter.

338. (S) [redacted] says he viewed the coordination process as a method of [redacted] while coping with political sensitivities at the Embassy. The coordination process allowed [redacted] reports to be widely distributed, albeit in draft form. [redacted] normally would not disseminate a report if the coordination process resulted in negative comments, yet consumers already would have been made aware of the information in draft form.

[redacted] notes that [redacted] received similar negative reactions to its reports from other Embassies during 1983. A contributing factor may have been the lack of expertise on the part of

[redacted]

340. (S) [redacted] recalls that the initial reporting provided by [redacted] was general in nature and that CIA and [redacted] expressed concerns in that regard. He says that [redacted] reporting became more specific and substantial over time. The generality of the early reporting may have been caused by [redacted]

attempts to solicit information regarding internal Honduran matters before [redacted] became comfortable [redacted]

341. (S) DIA Personnel. DIA's Honduran Analyst from 1982 through 1987 says there existed an informal arrangement wherein [redacted] officers met with him to discuss future debriefings of sources. [redacted] also would provide draft copies of its intelligence reports to the DIA Analyst for his comments. The DIA Analyst recalls meeting with the [redacted] intermittently during 1983 and 1984 concerning [redacted] reportedly was not sure of [redacted] bona fides and periodically consulted with the DIA Analyst about information he had obtained. [redacted] also sought out issues to explore with [redacted] in an attempt to assess his credibility and to obtain information of interest to intelligence consumers. The DIA Analyst recalls that [redacted] appeared to have the access he claimed and generally provided substantive information.

342. [redacted]

343. (S) [redacted] The DIA Analyst does not have any

recollection of any comments by [redacted] and USCINCSO and says that he was unaware of any efforts to suppress reporting in this or any other matter.

344. (S) According to the DIA Analyst, the focus for analysts during the Olancho Operation was on how well the Hondurans reacted to the first insurgent penetration from Nicaragua. Analysts were impressed that the Honduran military could mobilize and effectively address the threat. The Honduran response was viewed as sending a message to future groups that were plotting similar actions. In addition, analysts were interested in learning whether the population within Olancho supported the insurgents. Carney was not of primary analytical concern to the DIA Analyst as other interests took priority.

345. (S) The DIA Analyst recalls the 1983 draft AOG report and believes that certain details in it were inaccurate. Specifically, he says CINC Alvarez was not believed to have ordered the executions because Alvarez was too smart to leave evidence of his involvement and knew that such acts would never remain a secret. The DIA Analyst believes that [redacted] had a negative bias against Alvarez. In addition, the DIA Analyst believes that the Hondurans had observed human rights issues being addressed in El Salvador and knew that it made sense to use Reyes Mata for propaganda purposes rather than execute him. Nonetheless, the DIA Analyst considered [redacted] to be corrupt and capable of splitting the insurgents' money with CINC Alvarez.

346. (S) The DIA Analyst recalls talking with [redacted] in 1983 concerning Reyes Mata's fate. He says that [redacted] understanding was that Reyes Mata was wounded in combat, would not talk when interrogated and was then left to die. Analytical attention was focused on the Olancho Operation for only a two- to three-month period and, by April 1984, the issue was forgotten at the Embassy.

347. (S) The DIA Analyst says he was not privy to the two October 19, 1983 CIA Sensitive Memorandum reports concerning prisoner executions. In regard to the identity of the "field commander," the DIA Analyst maintains that this was not the officer [redacted] but his superior. He describes [redacted] as commanding the SFC units that were split up and used to supplement other military elements in the Olancho Operation.

348. [redacted]

349. [redacted]

350. [redacted]

[redacted]

351. (S) [redacted] Personnel. [redacted] recalls that, upon his arrival in Tegucigalpa, the Olancho Operation was coming to a close. [redacted] the [redacted] was concerned with issues relating to the Honduran military.

352. (S) [redacted] recalls that there were "no requests to tone down, suppress, stifle, withhold, or manage information" in regard to the 1983 draft [redacted] report or any other instances during his tenure in Honduras. [redacted] does not recall Negroponte having particular sensitivities to issues, nor does he recall Embassy personnel seeking to limit [redacted] reporting. He recalls rumors that prisoner executions had taken place during the Olancho Operation, but that [redacted] did not have evidence to substantiate them. [redacted] believes that the [redacted] comment on the 1983 draft [redacted] report was prepared by [redacted] who subsequently died [redacted]

353. (S) [redacted] has no recollection of the 1983 draft [redacted] report or the exchange of related messages [redacted] He says that several U.S. military representatives visited the Embassy on temporary duty and that their reporting was not balanced or placed in the proper context. [redacted]

[redacted]

354. [redacted]

355. [redacted] concerns were shared, he says, with [redacted] First, the AOG report was redundant in that the prisoner executions already had been reported by CIA [redacted] In this respect, he says, the AOG report would have added importance to the event and focused excessive attention on it. Second, there were concerns regarding the objectivity and credibility of the draft AOG report and whether the details concerning CINC Alvarez's involvement were accurate. [redacted] not in a position to know readily whether Alvarez was involved in a decision to execute the prisoners. The third area for concern related to the amount of money that was cited in the report as having purportedly been stolen [redacted] says that the amount reported was absolutely wrong.

356. [redacted] says that the November 22, 1983 [redacted] report [redacted] had a "phrasing problem." While it was factually correct, it failed to emphasize Negroponte's concern over reporting on an event that had previously been reported by CIA in two disseminated intelligence reports. [redacted] acknowledges that the Ambassador was sensitive to

political ramifications that might have resulted from such reporting and its possible effect [redacted] However, he indicates that this was not a factor in the absence of further reporting regarding the executions and emphasizes that CIA had previously reported on that issue.

357. (S) [redacted] discussed the 1983 draft AOG report with [redacted] While he agrees that the [redacted] regarding that discussion is essentially accurate, he says that it does not emphasize the basis for no further reporting on the prisoner executions—the event had been reported previously and there was concern on the part of Negroponte that over-emphasis would create an unwarranted human rights problem for Honduras.

358. (S) [redacted] the executions had occurred and had been reported and there was nothing new to report that would be of importance to consumers. Although the October 15 and October 17, 1983 [redacted] reports did not contain specific names or military units involved in executions, [redacted] provided sufficient information to permit identification of the perpetrators by cross-referencing of other reporting. The fact that executions took place was not an issue being addressed by the Hondurans. The focus of Honduran officials was on investigating [redacted]

359. (S) [redacted] believes that his actions and Negroponte's concern were parts of "a legitimate effort to manage the perception of Honduras." He notes that information concerning the Olancho Operation and the executions was not suppressed [redacted] acknowledges that the amount of reporting that should have been developed regarding the executions is debatable, but states [redacted]

[redacted] states that the Embassy was "not working in a political vacuum, although it did not delay, withhold, or suppress intelligence reporting."

360. (S) [redacted] emphasizes that the Embassy did not want to change or stop an AOG report from being published, but only wanted the opportunity to comment. [redacted] not aware of any attempts by Negroponte or [redacted] to withhold human rights information from Washington.

361. [redacted]

362. (S) A DI Analyst with responsibilities for Honduras at the time recalls the 1983 draft AOG report regarding prisoner executions and explains that one of her assigned duties was reviewing message traffic and forwarding it with comments to DI branch and division management. The analyst says the significance of the draft AOG

report was that it implicated CINC Alvarez in the executions. Although she does not recall the disposition of the draft AOG report, she says that AOG's reporting was not considered reliable by CIA analysts.

CONCLUSION

363. (S) [redacted] reported on November 5, 1983 that [redacted] had killed Reyes Mata. [redacted] to review this AOG report on November 21, 1983 and reminded [redacted] of the two October 1983 reports [redacted] that indicated that unnamed Honduran Army officers had executed prisoners.

364. (S) [redacted] on November 22, 1983 that the Ambassador was particularly sensitive regarding the issue and was concerned that earlier CIA reporting on the same topic might create a human rights problem for Honduras. Based on the Ambassador's reported concerns [redacted] actively discouraged [redacted] from following up the information reported by the [redacted] source.

365. (S) [redacted] justified this action by noting that the information regarding executions by the Honduran Army had already been reported [redacted] in the two October 1983 reports. While these reports did not contain the names of the executioners or specific Honduran military units that were involved [redacted] believed that receiving these identities in the AOG report would not have made a difference to intelligence consumers. [redacted] also believes [redacted] provided sufficient information to permit identification of the perpetrators by cross-referencing of other reporting.

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


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[redacted]

372. [redacted]

373. [redacted]

374. (S) October 15, 1983 [redacted] The first document was an October 15, 1983 [redacted] indicating that a number of PRTCH guerrillas, including insurgent leader Reyes Mata, had been executed during the Olancho Operation. The executions were reportedly initiated after the "field commander" in the Olancho Department received an order from the Honduran Armed Forces General Staff to "search and destroy." This order reportedly was construed as meaning that no prisoners were to be taken alive. The executions were carried out by "officers" in an isolated area away from the enlisted men. No further information relating to the identities of the "field commander," the "officers," or the specific

armed forces elements that conducted the executions was contained [redacted]

375. [redacted]

376. (S) October 17, 1983 [redacted] The second document [redacted] indicated that captured PRTCH guerrillas in the Olancho Department were executed by "the Honduran Armed Forces." No further identifying information regarding who had performed the executions was contained in the report or an accompanying operational cable. [redacted]

377. (S) 1983 Draft AOG Report. On November 18, 1983, CIA Headquarters received the 1983 draft AOG report from [redacted] indicating that Reyes Mata had been executed by [redacted] Electronic copies were sent to components within CIA's DI and to the DI's electronic records storage system. [redacted] received the report in paper form only, [redacted]

378. [redacted]

[redacted]

379. (S) November 23, 1983 AOG [redacted] On February 16, 1984 unknown INSCOM representative(s) provided [redacted] with a paper copy of the November 23, 1983 [redacted] from [redacted] reiterating that [redacted] had executed Reyes Mata. The message also indicated that [redacted] was under investigation for the theft of funds that had been confiscated from the PRTCH guerrillas in Olancho and noted that Carney had died of natural causes [redacted] had reportedly shared the money with officers and soldiers each time they killed or captured a guerrilla. [redacted]

380. (S) November 21, 1983 [redacted] The final document was a November 21, 1983 [redacted] that the 1983 draft AOG report from [redacted] names [redacted] as having killed Jose Maria Reyes Mata some days after his capture in Olancho Department, and says that [redacted] conferred before and after the execution with [CINC Alvarez]." [redacted] of the October 15 and 17 [redacted] reports that resulted in the October 19, 1983 [redacted] reports related to executions, but noted that the [redacted] could neither name the executioners nor state whether higher authorities were aware of or had approved the executions. [redacted]


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
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391. [redacted]

CONCLUSION

392. [redacted] response indicated that there was no derogatory information regarding [redacted] and did not make reference to indications that [redacted] as "the field commander"—may have participated in the 1983 Olancho Operation and prisoner executions. Factors that appear to have contributed to Headquarters' failure to locate and provide this information [redacted] included:

- [redacted] failed to document the specific identities of the alleged Honduran Army executioners, including "the field commander," who were referred to in the two October 1983 CIA reports.

- Thus, the October 1983 [redacted] reports that implicated "the field commander" in prisoner executions did not contain any reference to [redacted] also failed to identify "the field commander" [redacted]

- [redacted] failed to request additional information [redacted] regarding the identities of the Honduran Army officers who were referred to in the two October 1983 CIA reports as having been involved in prisoner executions.

- [redacted] Thus, the two AOG reports that were received by the Agency in November 1983 and February 1984 and identified [redacted] as one of those implicated in the executions were not retrievable by CIA.

- Since none of this information was indexed or retrievable [redacted] it did not come to the attention of Headquarters personnel who [redacted]



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

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

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397. [redacted]

(U) Relevant Cables and Correspondence

398. [redacted]

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
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

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

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


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
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

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
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

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

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


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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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


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

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

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


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

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

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

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



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(U) Recollections of Relevant Personnel

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


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
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

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

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CONCLUSION

489. [redacted]





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

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

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Hondurans who were considered to be leftists. [redacted] with a request that the reports be converted to Sensitive Memoranda dissemination format due to the sensitivity of the subject matter. One report addressed the structure and function of ELACH. The second report identified the victims of ELACH.

494. (S) [redacted] dated November 25, 1985, indicated that Mario Izaguirre had been the Director of ELACH since 1980. Izaguirre reportedly maintained direct contact with DNI Director Colonel Guillermo Pinel Calix, who provided Izaguirre with the identities of individuals who were to be placed under surveillance. It was reported [redacted] that ELACH members also maintained an informal liaison with members of the DNI and the 316th. Among the names of those in the 316th Battalion who were contacted by ELACH members to discuss ELACH operations was Captain Siro Pablo Fernandez Cuevas, also known as "Captain Urquia."

495. (S) [redacted] had reported on July 14, 1983 that Urquia was responsible for the overall command of a FUSEP interrogation site and that he conducted kidnappings for ransom. [redacted]

496. (S) On November 26, 1985, [redacted] the second report on ELACH based upon [redacted] This report identified Honduran leftists who were allegedly executed by ELACH between 1980 and 1984: Pablo Moran, Tomas Nativi, Fidel Martinez, Angel Manfredo Velazquez, Hermino Caceres Castellanos, Samuel Perez, Nelson Makay, Jose Ernesto Velazquez, and Eduardo Lanza Becerra. It was reported that Izaguirre participated with DNI operatives Carlos Alfredo Martinez, Marcos Hernandez and Tranquilino Campos in the

kidnapping of leftist student activist Omar Gustavo Vazquez Amaya, who died during interrogation. Consequently, Martinez was separated from the DNI and DNI Director Major Juan Blas Salazar Mesa was fired. The report also included a list of Honduran leftists who had been placed under ELACH surveillance [redacted]

497. (S) [redacted] all persons reported [redacted] as killed or missing in 1981 and 1982 were identified in the book "Human Rights in Honduras" that had been published by the Honduran Documentation Center in 1984.

498. (S) [redacted] according [redacted] during the 1980 to 1984 period when executions had been carried out, each execution had to be approved by the Honduran Armed Forces Commander and the President of Honduras. [redacted] comments indicated, however, that no requests for approval of executions had been made since Brigadier General Walter Lopez Reyes assumed command of the Armed Forces in April 1984.

499. (S) The information contained in the two [redacted] reports regarding ELACH was disseminated [redacted] in a December 1985 Sensitive Memorandum to the Director of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the U.S. Ambassadors at Tegucigalpa and Panama City, and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Southern Command.

500. (S) [redacted] and noted that it was important to

continue to collect information in order to obtain more details about the past and present operations of ELACH. [redacted] providing leads for further investigation of ELACH activities. [redacted] indicated that it would be useful to determine the identities of the individuals who were aware of the existence of the ELACH operation and its victims. [redacted]

501. (S) Congressional Notification. On February 27, 1986, a letter was prepared by [redacted] for DCI William Casey's signature and transmittal to the Chairmen of the HPSCI and SSCI. The letter described the November 1985 reporting [redacted] regarding ELACH and the January 1986 reporting [redacted] that the 316th Battalion had ordered ELACH to mount surveillance on several Honduran leftists. The letter noted that, prior to making the ELACH information available to the Committees, every effort had been made to verify its authenticity and the reliability of the source.

502. (S) The letter also stated that Casey was personally committed to investigating fully any additional information the CIA received in this regard and that CIA would acquire [redacted] reporting regarding ELACH. The letter indicated [redacted] and asserted that, over time, many of the individuals who were implicated in human rights abuses had been reassigned out of positions of responsibility in the Honduran intelligence services. The letter expressed Casey's concern that ELACH would continue to be a viable organization with high level contacts in the Honduran Government. The HPSCI and SSCI Chairmen were assured by the Casey letter that CIA would examine possible measures to resolve this problem and would bring

the matter to the attention of the appropriate senior Honduran Government officials, including then-President Azcona. Casey signed and forwarded letters containing these statements to Representative Lee Hamilton and Senator David Durenberger on February 27, 1986.

503. (S) On March 14, 1986, [redacted] prepared a response to a White House request for information concerning an inquiry from Congressman Gerry E. Studds regarding what CIA knew of the Honduran Government's involvement in death squad activities. The response indicated that [redacted] had been allocated to determine whether any information was available that confirmed the allegations. The response also noted that the CIA had not tried to cover up or discourage the publication of information regarding death squad activities and that no CIA officer had tried to influence assignments, promotions, or continued military service of officers in the Honduran Army. This response was signed by [redacted] and forwarded to the White House on March 21, 1986.

504. (S) An April 24, 1986 CIA response to a question raised by the SSCI regarding Honduran human rights abuses was also prepared [redacted] The question focused on what the CIA knew about human rights violations in Honduras prior to 1986. The response indicated that CIA had been investigating allegations of Honduran Government-sponsored human rights abuses. [redacted] information regarding allegations that the Honduran Government was directly involved in human rights violations. The response noted that, prior to the late 1985 receipt of the information regarding ELACH activities, the CIA did not have specific information that linked Honduran officials to death squad activity and had only unsubstantiated allegations of official involvement. This response was signed by [redacted] on May 8, 1986 and forwarded to Keith Hall of the SSCI Staff.

505. (S) SSCI Staff Members Visit Tegucigalpa. An SSCI Staff delegation visited Honduras from March 14 to March 17, 1986. A Staff member prepared a March 18, 1986 Memorandum for the Record (MFR) stating [redacted] told the visitors that he was "absolutely certain that since 1984 there had been no murders, kidnappings, or torture of any Honduran leftists." [redacted] said that he could not guarantee that there was no sharing of information between the 316th Battalion and ELACH because of the high level contacts ELACH maintained with members of the Honduran Armed Forces. According to the MFR, [redacted] said that the 316th Battalion had continued to conduct surveillance operations against Honduran leftists and that President Azcona had not yet been apprised of the high level contacts ELACH had in the Honduran Government.

506. (S) The MFR noted that [redacted] informed the Staff members that the 316th Battalion had been scheduled to be disbanded in January 1986 and converted to the counterintelligence component of a new Honduran intelligence service [redacted] The MFR also indicated that [redacted] told the Staff members that there had been a delay, and it was now anticipated that the 316th Battalion would be disbanded in March or April 1986. [redacted]

(U) Recollections of Relevant Personnel

507. (S) Headquarters Personnel. [redacted] notes in an April 23, 1997 letter that, during the period under investigation, [redacted] were instructed specifically to report any and all

508. (S) [redacted] recalls that ELACH was not an issue that Casey would have concerned himself with, nor would he have raised it as an issue. [redacted] states that, while there were conversations of Casey's to which he was not privy, a discussion of ELACH would not have been one of them. [redacted] follow-up action that is referred to in Casey's February 27, 1986 letter to the HPSCI and SSCI could easily have been forgotten because of more important issues. The focus at the time, according to [redacted] was the Contras [redacted] says that then-DDO Claire George never mentioned ELACH, nor had [redacted] ever heard of ELACH.

509. [redacted] He also describes [redacted] as being fully committed to keeping the oversight committees well informed of CIA activities. Fiers also [redacted] repeatedly advised [redacted] congressional interest in human rights issues and abuses. [redacted] says that Fiers asked him personally to address the human rights issues [redacted]

510. (S) [redacted] presence added an independent White House review of the human rights issue in Honduras. [redacted]



511. (S) [redacted] suggests that it was in part a response to congressional interest in human rights issues in Honduras as a result of the ELACH reporting and Casey's commitment to follow-up. [redacted]

512. [redacted]

513. [redacted]

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

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

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

517.

[redacted]

518. (S) [redacted] were tasked routinely to report on human rights violations. He believes it was not unusual that no information would be reported [redacted] about ELACH since [redacted] had no information to report. [redacted]

519. (S) [redacted] recalls that Contra-related issues were discussed [redacted] but he does not recall discussing ELACH in such a setting. [redacted] does not recall being informed at the time that CIA had notified the Congress of the existence of ELACH and had promised to follow-up on the issue.

520. (S) [redacted] says [redacted] tried to verify information on ELACH. He does not believe that ELACH was so secret that [redacted] would be ignorant of it. [redacted] says that others [redacted] who would have been in a position to know whether ELACH existed had never heard of it. [redacted] questions whether ELACH ever existed [redacted]

521. (S) [redacted] says that there was a constant and pervasive requirement to collect information regarding human rights abuses [redacted]

[redacted] he recalls that [redacted] emphasized the significance of human rights reporting and its importance to the oversight committees and CIA. He says that the Embassy was required to report on human rights abuses [redacted]

522. (S) [redacted]

523. (S) [redacted] knew that [redacted] attempted to collect additional information about ELACH, but were "coming up dry." This, [redacted] applied to other issues as well as ELACH.

524. [redacted]

CONCLUSION



[6] (U) The basis and nature of this agreement is discussed in the next section of this Report.


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
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
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
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
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

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

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579. [redacted]

[redacted]

580. [redacted]

581. [redacted]

582. [redacted]

[redacted]

CONCLUSION

583. [redacted]

584. [redacted]

DID A CIA EMPLOYEE PROVIDE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS REGARDING THE FATE OF FATHER CARNEY TO THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE CIA?

585. (S) [redacted] provided information regarding the fate of an American priest and Reyes Mata that he said he had failed to report [redacted] when he obtained the information [redacted] in 1985. [redacted] said that it was not until [redacted] 1995 and 1996 that he learned that the American priest was Father Carney. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

586. [redacted]

587. [redacted]

588. (S) Potential Conflicting Statements. [redacted]

[redacted] several discrepancies were identified by the Honduras Working Group between the information provided by [redacted] in December 1995 and January

1996 and that which he provided to the HPSCI Staff members in July 1996. The specific discrepancies, and [redacted] responses to the IG regarding them, are as follows:

- [redacted] Statement. [redacted] records do not indicate that [redacted] attributed any statements regarding Father Carney's fate to [redacted]

  HPSCI Statement. The [redacted] record indicates that [redacted] stated that [redacted] had said that the priest was dead when found by the Hondurans.

  IG Statement [redacted] says that [redacted] did not say that he personally had found the priest, but only that the priest had died of malnutrition.

- [redacted] Statement. According to [redacted] records, [redacted] said that [redacted] a former member of the Honduran Special Forces Unit that participated in searching for the guerrilla band with which Father Carney entered Honduras, claimed that he had been present when the priest was found dead and decomposed in a hammock in the jungle and that he placed the skull of the priest into his backpack.

  HPSCI Statement. The [redacted] indicates that [redacted] said that [redacted] claimed that the Honduran troops carried the priest's head in a knapsack.

  IG Statement. [redacted] states that [redacted] claimed to have placed the skull of the priest into his own backpack. .

- [redacted] Statement. According to [redacted] records, [redacted] said that [redacted] had provided him with information in 1985 or 1986 regarding the fate of the insurgents during the Honduran military operation to locate the group in 1983.

[redacted] also reportedly said that [redacted] claimed that he was aware that captured prisoners had been pushed from helicopters as part of the interrogation/intimidation campaign against the guerrillas.

HPSCI Statement. The [redacted] record indicates that [redacted] said that he had heard rumors in 1985 from junior Honduran military officials that some guerrillas were thrown from helicopters during the Olancho operation.

IG Statement. [redacted] states that rumors of people being thrown out of helicopters were common [redacted] also states that it was in 1988 or 1989 that he had heard street rumors that the Hondurans may have thrown individuals out of helicopters to their deaths. He states that [redacted] never mentioned anything about this to him.

CONCLUSION

589. (S) The record of [redacted] statements to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the record of [redacted] statements to [redacted] contain slight discrepancies. However, none of the discrepancies appear to be significant.

[redacted]

590. [redacted]

591. [redacted]

592. [redacted]

593. [redacted]

[redacted]

(S) Possible Involvement of [redacted] in Torture or Hostile Interrogations.

594. (S) HWG Finding: The Honduras Working Group received an allegation that [redacted] may have been present during a hostile Honduran interrogation of a prisoner. On behalf of the HWG, investigators from [redacted] interviewed [redacted] in this regard. He denied that he had ever been present during any interrogation, hostile or otherwise, conducted [redacted]

595. (S) IG Finding: The IG investigation found no evidence to substantiate the allegation that [redacted] was present at a hostile interrogation or participated in torture of a prisoner [redacted]

[redacted]

596. [redacted]

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

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

601. [redacted]

(U) Failure to Notify Congress of Significant Developments.

602. (S) HWG Finding: The Honduras Working Group found that a February 1986 letter from DCI Casey informed Congress of his commitment to investigate fully any additional information the CIA received regarding ELACH, the right-wing paramilitary organization that was allegedly implicated along with Honduran officials in death squad activities. The Honduras Working Group noted that, [redacted] failed to provide additional information on ELACH and failed to advise a visiting SSCI Staff delegation in March 1996 of [redacted]

603. (S) IG Finding: [redacted] sought additional information on ELACH from [redacted] but none could provide additional information. Furthermore, they say that none [redacted] could confirm the alleged existence of ELACH. Information regarding the alleged existence of ELACH and the identities of its members was reported [redacted]

In February 1986, DCI Casey informed the SSCI and the HPSCI by letter that CIA would investigate fully and [redacted] provide additional information regarding ELACH. [redacted]

604. [redacted]

605. (S) [redacted] Since [redacted] did not learn of [redacted] until April 1986 it would have been impossible for [redacted] to report to the SSCI Staff members in March 1986 that [redacted] had been mistreated by a [redacted]

[redacted]

606. (S) HWG Finding: The Honduras Working Group concluded that Headquarters managers failed to devote sufficient attention to routine support activities [redacted]

607 [redacted]

[redacted]

608. [redacted]

(U) Other HWG Issues.

609 [redacted]

(a) [redacted]

(b) [redacted]

(c) [redacted]

(d) Potential politicization by the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) in 1984 in that DI analysts allegedly revised their judgment in a memorandum to Congress [redacted]

(e) Potential politicization by the DI in 1988 when a DI manager allegedly told subordinates that he was reluctant to disparage the Honduran Government in an intelligence report [redacted]

(f) [redacted]

610. [redacted]

611. (S) [redacted] the two issues identified by the Honduras Working Group relating to alleged politicization of DI analysis be investigated by the IG. In a September 11, 1996

response to the Executive Director, the IG recommended that the two potential politicization issues be reviewed by the DI's Ombudsman for Politicization. [redacted]

CONCLUSIONS

612. *(S) WAS [redacted] AN [redacted] CIA EMPLOYEE PRESENT DURING SESSIONS OF HOSTILE INTERROGATION OR TORTURE IN HONDURAS?*

No evidence has been found to substantiate the allegation [redacted] that [redacted] any [redacted] CIA employee was present during sessions of hostile interrogation or torture in Honduras.

613. *(S) WHAT DID [redacted] REPORT CONCERNING REYES MATA AND FATHER CARNEY? DID [redacted] FAIL TO FOLLOW-UP CIA REPORTING THAT [redacted] WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR KILLING REYES MATA AND HIS INSURGENTS--POSSIBLY INCLUDING FATHER CARNEY?*

[redacted] produced timely and substantial intelligence on the Olancho Operation, including relevant information regarding Reyes Mata and Carney:

- An October 15, 1983 [redacted] indicated that [redacted] said that prisoners captured during the Olancho Operation had been executed by Honduran Army officers and that Reyes Mata was among those executed. The executions reportedly were initiated after the "field commander" in Olancho--not otherwise identified--received an order from the Honduran Armed Forces General Staff to "search and destroy." An October 17, 1983

[redacted] indicated that [redacted] confirmed the earlier report and added that Reyes Mata was held for a couple of days before being executed. Neither of these reports contained the identities of the alleged executioners or any information regarding the fate of Carney.

- [redacted]

- [redacted]

- [redacted] efforts to collect human intelligence on the Olancho Operation were hampered by [redacted] Thus, no further relevant information was acquired [redacted]

- [redacted] was told by [redacted] late 1994 or early 1995 that Carney was either dead or near death when [redacted] happened upon him while patrolling the jungle during the 1983 Olancho Operation. [redacted]

[redacted]

- [redacted] collected additional information from [redacted] in February 1997 regarding the fate of Father Carney. [redacted] subsequently shed some doubt on the source's credibility in this regard.

614. (S) [redacted] *TO DETERMINE CARNEY'S FATE IN VIEW OF REPEATED QUERIES FROM CONGRESS AND THE CARNEY FAMILY?*

[redacted]

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

Despite these efforts, however, the precise fate of Carney remains unknown to CIA.

615. (S) *WHAT OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSETS REPORTED RELEVANT INFORMATION REGARDING REYES MATA AND CARNEY? [redacted] FOLLOW-UP ON NON-CIA REPORTING CONCERNING REYES MATA AND CARNEY?*

An Army Operational Group (AOG) source reported on November 5, 1983 that [redacted] had killed Reyes Mata. [redacted]

616. [redacted]

[redacted]

- [redacted] failed to document the specific identities of the alleged Honduran Army executioners, including "the field commander," who were referred to in the two October 1983 CIA reports.

- Thus, the October 1983 [redacted] reports that implicated "the field commander" in prisoner executions did not contain any reference to [redacted] also failed to identify "the field commander" [redacted].

- [redacted] regarding the identities of the Honduran Army officers who were referred to in the two October 1983 CIA reports as having been involved in prisoner executions.

- [redacted] Thus, the two AOG reports that were received by the Agency in November 1983 and February 1984 and identified [redacted] as one of those implicated in the executions were not retrievable by CIA.

- Since none of this information was [redacted] retrievable [redacted] it did not come to the attention of Headquarters personnel who conducted the June 1989 file review [redacted].

617. [redacted]

- [redacted]
- [redacted]
- [redacted]

618. (S) *WAS THERE FOLLOW-UP ON THE ELACH REPORTING* [redacted] *ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF DCI CASEY'S COMMITMENT TO CONGRESS?*

[redacted] provided information regarding the existence of ELACH in November 1985 [redacted]

[redacted] none could provide additional information. Furthermore, none [redacted] could confirm the alleged existence of ELACH.

619. [redacted]

620. (C) *DID A CIA EMPLOYEE PROVIDE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS REGARDING THE FATE OF FATHER CARNEY TO THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE CIA?*

The record of [redacted] statements to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the record of [redacted] statements to the Office of Personnel Security contain slight discrepancies. However, none of the discrepancies appear to be significant.

[redacted]

A. R. Cinquegrana

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATIONS

1.

2. (U) The findings of this Report of Investigation should be reviewed in any individual accountability determinations that are to be considered on the basis of the Honduras Working Group (HWG) findings.

3. (U) As recommended by the Inspector General on September 11, 1996, the Directorate of Intelligence Ombudsman for Politicization should be instructed by the Executive Director to review the two potential politicization issues that were identified by the HWG.

CONCUR:

F. P. Hitz

Frederick P. Hitz
Inspector General

8/27/97

Date

ANNEX

ANNEX

(U) Additional CIA Reporting Regarding the Olancho Operation

1. (S) July 11, 1983 Intelligence Report. [redacted] that a meeting was held in Mexico City in late June 1983 that was attended by representatives of various Honduran leftist extremist groups. The PRTCH was represented by Reyes Mata. The groups agreed to form the Revolutionary Unity Movement (MUR) and to begin implementation of the initial phase of rural guerrilla warfare. The groups were in the process of studying potential targets within Honduras.

2. [redacted]

3. (S) August 10, 1983 Intelligence Report. [redacted] Honduran debriefings of two individuals who had deserted from the PRTCH guerrilla force located in the mountains of Olancho Department. The two individuals described being infiltrated into

Honduras from Nicaragua beginning in mid-July 1983 after being trained in Cuba. The leader of the group and a political officer were identified, respectively, as Reyes Mata and "Father Fausto Milla, known as Mario." The guerrillas had planned to consolidate with other guerrilla fronts and recruit new members until either September or October 1983. This group was one of four distinct fronts, all of which were to be unified under the command of Reyes Mata.

4. [redacted]

5. [redacted]

6. (S) August 10, 1983: [redacted] During the briefing, a close-up photograph of a M-16 rifle, obtained from a guerrilla, was presented. The markings on the rifle, among other identifiable information, indicated that the equipment was the property of the U.S. Government. [redacted]

7. (S) August 10, 1983 [redacted] sweep of the Cordillera Entre Rios area was planned. The purpose of this effort was to confirm that the guerrillas, who had infiltrated from Nicaragua, were establishing base camps in Honduras.

8. (S) August 11, 1983 National Intelligence Daily. CIA reported in an item published in the National Intelligence Daily that the Cuban-trained insurgents were present near the Patuca River in the Olancho Department and planned to begin unspecified guerrilla operations in September 1983. A commentary noted that the Sandinistas were following through on their threat to increase subversive activities against Honduras. The difficult terrain was predicted to be a factor in the outcome of the counterinsurgent operation.

9. (S) August 11, 1983 [redacted] the Honduran Armed Forces intended to launch a sweep operation against the guerrilla force affiliated with the PRTCH. The operation was planned to begin on August 11. Due to the difficult terrain, it was predicted that the operation could last 10 days.

10. [redacted]

11. [redacted]

12. (S) August 16, 1983 [redacted] August 15 Honduran television program that documented the history of the PRTCH guerrillas who deserted. During the show, the guerrillas talked about their recruitment, training in Cuba and return to Honduras via Nicaragua for subversive purposes. [redacted]

13. (S) August 17, 1983 Intelligence Report. [redacted] the organizational structure of the PRTCH in Honduras as provided by guerrillas who deserted. The PRTCH consisted of four major commands that were broken down into various sub-command centers that were further broken down into operational cells. The PRTCH's Central Command was located in Tegucigalpa and was divided into three sub-commands.

14. [redacted]

[redacted]

15. [redacted]

16. (S) August 19, 1983 [redacted] The Honduran Armed Forces were prepared to continue patrolling the area where the guerrillas were believed to be operating.

17. (S) August 24, 1983 [redacted] seven guerrillas had turned themselves in to the Honduran Army in Olancho. These individuals complained about having been recruited by the PRTCH under false pretenses and the lack of food and supplies.

18. (S) August 26, 1983 [redacted] hat 14 guerrillas had turned themselves in to Honduran authorities and it was believed that others had deserted. Deserters advised that one of their officers had been executed by a fellow insurgent officer for defeatist statements and at least two members of this group had died of starvation.

19. (S) August 30, 1983 National Intelligence Daily. CIA reported in an item in the National Intelligence Daily that the Hondurans had captured several guerrillas who all advised that they had been trained in Nicaragua and Cuba. In a commentary, it was

noted that the apparent attempt by Cuba and Nicaragua to start an insurgency in Honduras was doing poorly. The remaining guerrillas were believed to pose little threat to the internal security of Honduras, although it was believed that the Sandinistas were likely to continue sending trained insurgents into the country to put pressure on the government.

20. (S) August 31, 1983 [redacted] asked what the Honduran authorities should do with the guerrilla deserters once they had been debriefed and he noted that some of the deserters were sincere although some had turned themselves in because of starvation. [redacted] recommended that the Honduran Government treat all members of the group as being sincere while giving them clothing, food and shelter in a military facility where they had the liberty of the base but would be under observation. [redacted] recommended that the deserters be allowed visits by their families.

21. (S) [redacted] reportedly advised that the deserters would be sent to the Artillery Camp at Zamorano. [redacted] indicated that the Honduran Government understood the importance of treating the captured guerrillas well. However, the Honduran Government also realized that some members of the group presented a counterintelligence problem and could not be monitored if all members were released immediately. On the other hand, some of the deserters appeared to be genuinely hostile to the Nicaraguan and Cuban Governments for the deception reportedly used to recruit them into the insurgency.

22. (S) September 2, 1983 Intelligence Report. [redacted] results of the Olancho operation [redacted]

[redacted] Without firing a weapon, the Honduran Army reportedly had taken 16 insurgents into custody. The insurgents, suffering from malnutrition, disease and low morale, continued to desert and surrender to the Army.

23. (S) [redacted] believed that there were three reasons for the Honduran Army's success in the counterinsurgent operation. First, the Army responded before the guerrillas were able to consolidate. Second, the Army won over the civilian population that had originally been sympathetic toward the insurgents. Third, the Army treated the prisoners humanely--evacuating them to Nueva Palestina where they were fed, provided medical treatment, debriefed, and then taken to Tegucigalpa. These factors had encouraged others to desert.

24. [redacted]

[redacted]

25. (S) September 3, 1983 Intelligence Report. [redacted]

PRTCH guerrilla by Honduran authorities. The guerrilla was taken into custody by a crew aboard a Honduran helicopter that was resupplying counterinsurgent forces in Olancho Department. He reportedly stated that he joined the group because the recruiter promised him training in accounting and was subsequently told that the school was in Nicaragua. When he arrived there, he was informed that he would receive political and military training in Cuba. He spent one year and six months in Cuba being trained as a platoon leader before being infiltrated into Honduras.

26. (S) The guerrilla also reportedly indicated that the group's leader was Reyes Mata and that its mission was to recruit and train sympathizers before conducting raids on Honduran military installations. He believed that the principal reason for the group's failure to accomplish its mission was its early discovery before it could consolidate its position in the countryside. Additional guerrillas were reportedly waiting in Nicaragua to be infiltrated.

27. [redacted]

[redacted]

28. (S) September 6, 1983 [redacted] concerning Honduran counterinsurgent activity near El Aguacate Airfield. On September 4, 1983, a 26-member insurgent group reportedly had engaged Honduran troops on the outskirts of the village of Rio Tinto. In this first actual military engagement of the counterinsurgent operation, one guerrilla reportedly was killed.

29. (S) September 6, 1983 [redacted] The insurgents were armed with M-16 rifles that were clean and maintained, fatigues that were probably manufactured in Cuba, and U.S. jungle boots. Medical supplies included products from West Germany and the USSR. Many of the grenades that were confiscated were armed with fuses having a zero or one second delay as indicated on the detonators. The captured guerrillas stated they were not aware of the timing capability and would have injured themselves if the grenades had been used. [redacted]

30. [redacted]

31. [redacted]

[redacted]

32. (S) September 14, 1983 Exclusive Intelligence Report [redacted] radio communications had been received by the Sandinistas from the PRTCH guerrillas in Olancho Department. One message reflected that Reyes Mata had ordered the execution of a lieutenant for allowing the defection of subordinates. In another message, Reyes Mata asserted that the members of his group who were being held by the Honduran Army were not deserters, but a reconnaissance platoon that had been captured. Several messages complained about the lack of logistical support to the group. [redacted]

33. [redacted]

[redacted]

34. [redacted]

35 [redacted]

36. (S) September 21, 1983 National Intelligence Daily. CIA reported in an item in the National Intelligence Daily that the Honduran Army was ". . . mopping up remnants of the insurgent group. . ." and that Reyes Mata had died in a battle. Operations against the insurgents were continuing and the Hondurans planned to follow-up with a civic action plan. A comment stated that the success of the counterinsurgent operation was attributed to the effectiveness of the Honduran Army and the ineptitude of the guerrillas. The decimation of the group and death of Reyes Mata, considered a capable guerrilla leader, were envisioned as possibly prompting the Sandinistas to reevaluate their efforts to promote an active insurgency in Honduras.

37. [redacted]

38. [redacted]

39. [redacted]

40. [redacted]

41. (S) October 1, 1983 Intelligence Report. [redacted] noted that most of the seven Honduran leftist extremist organizations had been relatively inactive. One exception was the PRTCH insurgency in Olancho Department that was quickly neutralized by the Honduran Armed Forces. As of late September 1983, only five of the original force of 96 guerrillas were still in the field. [redacted]

42. [redacted]



43. (S) November 2, 1983 Exclusive Intelligence Report [redacted] as of late October, about 20 PRTCH members were in Managua preparing to infiltrate Honduras to establish an insurgent front [redacted]



44. [redacted]

[redacted]

45. [redacted]

46. [redacted]

47. (S) December 28, 1983 Exclusive Intelligence Report [redacted] commented that Reyes Mata had been well informed of the treacherous nature of the Olancho terrain and the limited organizational support that was available. Reyes Mata could have saved himself and his men by returning to Nicaragua but, in the opinion of the official, opted to play a martyr role.

48. (S) A PCH leader reportedly had counseled Reyes Mata against the operation during its planning stages. Reyes Mata replied that he could not back out as he was under too much pressure from the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and that he believed the time was right, especially with the presence of the U.S. troops in Honduras.

49. [redacted]